Grassroots NGO Regulations and China's Local Legal Culture by High, Anna
1
gRaSSRootS ngo ReguLation and china’S LocaL LegaL 
cuLtuRe
Anna Jane High*
Law-lauding ideology and rhetoric has been increasingly evident in China 
since the end of  the Cultural Revolution. In conjunction with decades of  
rapid and prolific legal institution-building, this has provided rich data 
for scholarship on the trajectory of  China’s legal system, and the nature 
of  rule and order in modern Chinese society. Yet a solely law-centric 
approach to state regulation is not apposite to painting a complete picture 
of  how order is maintained in the distinctly non-legal Chinese culture. 
Drawing on fieldwork investigating non-state Chinese orphanages, I argue 
that the survival and proliferation of  such quasi- or non-legal grassroots 
non-government organizations is indicative of, and premised on, both the 
unwieldy and fragmented nature of  the Chinese state, and several defining 
points of  distinction of  law as a cultural notion in the Chinese context. 
These include a marked preoccupation with legitimacy over legality, and 
paternalistic discipline and discretion over impartial adjudication. An 
increased appreciation for China’s local legal culture has far-reaching 
implications for the ways in which both legal academics and practitioners 
engage with the Chinese legal system, which is best approached without 
constraining preconceptions about how law is used and regarded in local 
contexts. 
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i. intRoduction
What is the role of  law in modern China? This question is of  increasing 
importance to observers and practitioners, as China’s economic, cultural and 
political influence has grown exponentially in recent decades. Foreign direct 
investment in China is on the rise,1 its leadership is playing an increasingly 
prominent role in regional and global diplomacy and politics,2 and the United 
States has announced a rebalancing of  its strategic focus towards Asia and 
China in particular.3 More recently, with the 2012 People’s Republic of  China 
(PRC) leadership transition, and high-profile legal/political cases such as the 
Gu Kailai affair,4 China’s emerging and evolving legal system continues to be 
widely scrutinized. Back in 1996, China’s President Jiang Zemin adopted a new 
official policy of  ruling the country in accordance with law, and establishing a 
1 Kevin Zhang, What Explains the Boom of  Foreign Direct Investment in China?,54(2) 
international eConoMiCs 54 (2001).
2 David Shambaugh, Reforming China’s Diplomacy, CopenHagen DisCussion papers, asia 
researCH Centre (2010).
3 Christian Le Miere, America’s Pivot to East Asia: The Naval Dimension, 54(3) surViVal: 
global politiCs anD strategy 81 (June-July, 2012).
4 Andrew Jacobs, China Defers Death Penalty for Disgraced Official’s Wife, tHe new york 
tiMes (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes/com/2012/08/21/world/asia/china-
defers-death-penalty-for-gu-kailai.html.
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socialist law-ruled state (yifazhiguo, jiansheshuhuizhuyifazhiguo),5 a policy that is now 
incorporated into the PRC Constitution.6 Such law-lauding ideology and rhetoric 
has been increasingly evident in China since the end of  the Cultural Revolution 
in 1976 and, in conjunction with decades of  rapid and prolific legal institution-
building, has provided rich data for ample scholarship and discourse on the 
trajectory of  China’s legal system, and the nature of  rule and order in modern 
Chinese society. This body of  literature offers insight into China’s legal evolution 
and development, and is a useful framework for exploring the nexus between law 
and order in Chinese society. 
However rather than focusing on central Party-state rhetoric and policies, 
this article approaches the question of  law’s role in China from an underutilized 
perspective, namely that of  local state-society relationships. Further, it explores 
and challenges the legal/illegal binary presupposed by many Chinese legal studies, 
and its aptness in the Chinese context. Based on empirical research of  a set of  
‘illegal’ NGOs, namely privately-run, unregulated grassroots orphanages, I argue 
that ground-level observations of  local understandings, expectations and practices 
relating to law and order reveal a context best characterized as non-legal, being 
legitimacy-centric rather than law-centric. Formal law is not regarded by local 
Chinese actors in a way that is necessarily familiar to Western observers. Local 
NGOs acting beyond the limits of  legally acceptable behaviour regard themselves, 
and are commonly regarded by local state and social actors, as legitimate; the 
legality of  their existence and actions are not regarded as central to that legitimacy. 
The existence of  such non-legal NGOs is not regarded as problematic, and is 
premised not on an organization’s ability to abide by formal laws, but rather on 
an ability to regard informal rules and norms regulating their relationship with the 
state. The prevailing ‘legal sensibility’ in China, as visible at the local state-society 
interface, resonates more with themes of  paternalism and discipline, rather than 
law-centric ideas of  legality and rule of  law.
5 Randall Peerenboom, Competing Conceptions of  Rule of  Law in China, in asian DisCourses 
oF rule oF law: tHeories anD iMpleMentation oF rule oF law in twelVe asian 
Countries, FranCe anD tHe us, 109 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2003).
6 ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoXingfa [People’s Republic of  China Constitution], (Mar. 14, 
2004), art. 5.
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I begin in Part I by introducing the rule-of-law perspective on law and order 
in modern Chinese culture. I discuss how the (arguably Western) tendency to 
approach spaces of  order from such a law-centric perspective is not conducive to 
painting a full picture of  the Chinese context. From there, I turn to the empirical 
data, focusing on the experiences of  informal, ‘illegal’ or ‘quasi-legal’ grassroots 
NGOs as local governments utilize non-legal, legitimacy-centric, paternalistic 
norms, institutions and processes to structure local order and oversight. Part II 
introduces China’s civil society landscape and the case study NGOs, and Part 
III presents findings related to their interaction with local government, largely 
beyond the NGO framework established by law. These findings, discussed in 
Part IV, demonstrate that studies of  China’s legal history, culture, evolution and 
future development benefit from attention to the underlying culturally-contingent/
specific expectations and assumptions about the proper role and function of  law 
in maintaining social order. Despite thirty years of  law institution building and 
legal reform, central law-lauding rhetoric has only begun to penetrate China locally, 
and the lack of  a culture of  legality, as presented below, must be considered and 
accounted for when dealing with questions of  Chinese regulation, law and policy. 
ii. RuLe of Law and LegaL cuLtuRe
China’s post-Cultural Revolution legal system, which had to be established 
from scratch following the complete dismantling of  all legal processes and 
institutions during the ‘ten year turmoil’,7 has been pieced together in a remarkably 
short time. Over the past thirty years, the Chinese Party-state has been gradually but 
surely moving towards more law-lauding ideology, at least rhetorically, including 
an official policy, introduced into the PRC Constitution in the 1990s, of  ruling the 
country in accordance with law.8 In this fascinating, rapidly changing, and often 
contradictory context, scholarship on the trajectory of  China’s legal system, and 
the role of  law in this new China, abounds.9 The main empirical issues addressed 
7 China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, instituted by Chairman Mao in 1966, 
is commonly referred to as the ‘ten year turmoil’, due to the widespread economic, 
political and social chaos experienced during the decade of  revolution. 
8 Supra note 6, at art. 5.
9 See, e.g., ranDall peerenbooM, CHina’s long MarCH towarD rule oF law (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2002); Karen G. Turner et al. (eds.), tHe liMits oF tHe rule oF law in 
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in this field include the retreat of  the Party-state, the evolution of  the legislature, 
judiciary, legal profession and administrative law regimes, and the nexus between 
rule of  law and economic development, democracy and human rights. The ‘law 
and order’ meta-narrative is visibly played out in Party discourse, Five-year Plans,10 
Constitutional evolution and the astounding pace of  development of  the formal 
legal system. 
The basic distinction made in studies of  the role of  law in maintaining order 
is between rule by, and rule of, law:
Whereas the core of  rule of  law is the ability of  law and legal system to impose meaningful 
restraints on the state and individual members of  the ruling elite, rule by law refers to an 
instrumental conception of  law in which law is merely a tool to be used as the state sees fit.11
In China, the distinction has proved difficult to make empirically (which 
is nicely reflected in the lack of  a linguistic distinction, both concepts generally 
translated as fazhi, literally ‘law-ruled’). While generally scholars are in agreement 
that the direction of  legal reform over the last three decades has been away from 
rule by man and towards rule by law, the extent to which rule of law is in fact 
emerging, and its optimal nature and role in the Chinese context, are matters of  
much debate in the literature.12
CHina (U. of  Washington Press, 2000); Eric Orts, The Rule of  Law in China, 34 VanD. 
j. transnatl. l. 43 (2001); Albert Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in 
Contemporary China on the Rule of  Law, 17 uCla paC. basin l. j. 125 (1999-2000); Yufan 
Hao, From Rule of  Man to Rule of  Law: An Unintended Consequence of  Corruption in China 
in the 1990s, 8(22) j. oF ConteMporary CHina 405 (1999); Cao Jianming, WTO and the 
Rule of  Law in China, 16 teMp. int’l & CoMp. l. j. 379 (2002); Larry Diamond, The Rule 
of  Law as Transition to Democracy, 12(35) j. oF ConteMporary CHina 319 (2003); Pat K. 
Chew, The Rule of  Law: China’s Skepticism and the Rule of  People, 20 oHio st. j. on Disp. 
resol. 43 (2005); Geor Hintzen, The Place of  Law in the PRC’s Culture, 11 Cultural 
DynaMiCs 167 (1999); Zhiping Liang, Tradition and Change: Law and Order in a Pluralist 
Landscape, 11 Cultural DynaMiCs 215 (1999); Karen Turner, The Criminal Body and the 
Body Politic: Punishments in Early China, 11 Cultural DynaMiCs 237 (1999).
10 The ‘Five Year Plans’ of  China are a series of  political decisions, setting social and 
economic development initiatives and priorities for the PRC. The first was promulgated 
in 1953; a new Five Year Plan is due for the 2016-2020 period. See, e.g., Cindy Fan, 
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, 47(6) eurasian geograpHy anD eConoMiCs 708 (2006).
11 peerenbooM, supra note 9, at 8. 
12 See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or Is “Chinese Law” an Oxymoron?,11(2) williaM 
& Mary bill oF rigHts j. 655 (2003).
Grassroots NGO Regulation and China’s Local Legal Culture
6
Socio-Legal Review 2013Vol. 9(2)
The voluminous literature on rule by/of  law in China is useful for delving 
into the empirical question of  the nexus between law and order in Chinese society. 
The focus of  many studies of  Chinese law and order is fixed on the most visible 
manifestation of  the working out of  that nexus, namely institution-building, 
rhetoric and policy at the central/top level of  the Party-state. Chinese and foreign 
scholars alike have put forward a vast array of  opinions and descriptions, from 
conservative to liberal, on how the macro legal culture of  China continues to 
be shaped by these winds of  change blowing from Beijing and (purportedly) 
throughout China. The rule of  law question has been asked through the lenses 
of  globalisation, modernisation and economic development. I begin not with 
these meta-narratives, but instead ask what expectations, meanings and traditions 
relating to law and order (which I will broadly term Chinese legal sensibility) are 
evident at the level of  local relationships between officials and citizens? Traditional 
and historical cultural factors in which Chinese conceptions of  law and order are 
grounded have been discussed in depth in the literature,13 but tend, like the rule 
of  law debate generally, to be examined at the level of  the elite rulers and power-
holders. In this article, the focus shifts from official, state-endorsed conceptions 
of  law and order, to the experiences and expectations of  citizens in society. With 
regard to the former, opinions diverge in the literature on whether and to what 
extent the Chinese polity possess a notion of  law that is consistent with that 
required by rule of  law. William Alford, for example, argues that “the principal state 
architects of  China’s post-Cultural Revolution law reform project have a genuine 
ambivalence toward their undertaking”.14 Michael Dowdle, on the other hand, 
argues that any such ambivalence “manifests itself  in practice, not conception. 
Normatively, the Chinese, including the leadership, are overwhelmingly consistent 
in proclaiming the supremacy of  law over other forms of  political authority and 
over private interests”.15 The debate would benefit from greater attention to 
13 The most notable works include peerenbooM, supra note 9 and the 1999 special edition 
of  Cultural DynaMiCs, with contributions from (inter alia) William Alford, Geor 
Hintzen, Karen Turner, Michael Dowdle, Carine Defoort and Randall Peerenboom, 
and Zhiping Liang. See, also, tHoMas stepHens, orDer anD DisCipline in CHina: tHe 
sHangHai MixeD Court 1911–27 (Univ. of  Washington Press, 1992).
14 William Alford, A Second Great Wall? China’s Post-Cultural Revolution Project of  Legal 
Construction, 11 Cultural DynaMiCs 193, 198 (1999).
15 Michael Dowdle, Heretical Laments: China and the Fallacies of  ‘Rule of  Law’, 11 Cultural 
DynaMiCs 287, 301 (1999).
7
popular legal sensibility, as manifested in civil society and its engagement with 
low-level officials. At this local interface between state and society, ordinary 
citizens and government officials bring their own traditions and histories to their 
engagement with the legal system and the officials who represent it. 
By moving in this way from the macro to the micro, texture is added to our 
understanding of  the ideologies and traditions in which ‘law and order’ concepts 
in China continue to be grounded today, and a contribution will also, reflexively, 
be made to the bigger picture themes of  rule of  law and legal consciousness.16 
Empirical grassroots studies have potential to shed much light on the extent to 
which Beijing’s winds of  change, including the state’s “verbal homage to the 
sanctity of  law”,17 are penetrating the local sphere. In fact, the local picture painted 
herein is one in which law is not supreme, either in practice or rhetorically, and 
many features of  even a thin conception of  rule of  law are missing. However, as it 
will be shown, even though the ‘real’ rules of  engagement between the case study 
NGOs and the state have more to do with legitimacy, connections and ‘saving 
face’ than with many of  the features of  even a thin conception of  rule of  law, the 
picture that emerges is not one of  “lawless chaos”.18 The local snapshot presented 
herein is one imbued with themes of  paternalism, game-playing, give-and-take, 
suspicion and subordination. Above all, it is one of  order – not, admittedly, a 
type of  order associated with rule of  law and its threshold requirements such as 
predictability and certainty, but order nonetheless. My aim is not an ideological 
defence of, or policy recommendation regarding, this local picture, but a re-
examination of  the law-order nexus locally and what it tells us about notions and 
ideas about law and order in Chinese culture and society.  
This approach to ‘law and order’ is closely tied to ‘law as culture’, which seeks 
a more meaningful construction of  law situated in its total social context. In order 
16 The term ‘legal consciousness’ is common in socio-legal studies – for the purpose of  this 
paper, I adopt a simple definition, namely ‘ways in which ordinary people…understand and 
make sense of  law’ (Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: 
An Account of  Legal Consciousness, 26 new eng. l. reV. 731 (1991-1992), at 731.
17 peerenbooM, supra note 9, at 217.
18 Compare with Hintzen, supra note 9, at 169 (arguing that the picture that emerges on 
examining the social realities behind ‘China’s vociferous legal aspirations’ is ‘one of  
lawless chaos, where status, connections and money set the ‘real’ rules’).
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to investigate a culture’s dominant underlying beliefs about and meanings of  law, 
Clifford Geertz advocates a “hermeneutic tacking between two fields”, broadly, 
culture and law, allowing light to be shed on the mutually constitutive relationship 
between the two.19 Law is not studied as a semi-autonomous phenomenon, but is 
viewed as partaking of  concepts that extend across many domains of  social life, 
and analysed as “an extremely characteristic part of  the entire social fabric”.20 
In approaching this ‘law as culture’ nexus in the Chinese context, a common 
starting point is to examine Confucian and/or Socialist traditions, and to draw a 
connection with the emerging legal system of  the past thirty years.21 For example, 
scholars often draw attention to the Confucian emphasis on harmony, and its 
deeply embedded preference for li (rites or rituals) over fa (law) as the means of  
attaining political order. The latter is far less exalted in status and only “grudgingly 
accepted as a necessary evil” in the face of  the failure of  ritual order.22 Confucian 
political discourse is tied to a strong paternalistic tradition “in which the ruled are 
expected to defer to mother and father officials (fumuguan) much as children defer 
to their parents”.23 Paternalism, hierarchicalism, and a preference for customary or 
informal systems of  dispute resolution are seen as hallmarks of  Chinese culture, 
in addition to the very great importance placed by society on guanxi (personal 
networks) and renqing (human feelings, obligations or empathy), and particular/
substantive justice over general/procedural.24 The rise of  Socialism in more recent 
history did little to interrupt the continuation of  these themes, and “further 
called into question the normative basis of  law”.25 Law under Mao was seen as 
“an instrument to strengthen a paternalistic state”, and continued to be “held 
in low esteem as a means of  achieving social order”.26 Geor Hintzen similarly 
presents three continuing and distinctive aspects of  Chinese culture, namely the 
persistent normative force of  the family model in social life; the notion of  power 
and its consolidation in the hands of  individuals rather than in institutions; and 
19 CliFForD geertz, interpretation oF Cultures (Basic Books, 1973).
20 Id.
21 peerenbooM, supra note 9.
22 Carine Defoort and Randall Peerenboom, Law and Order in China, I, 11(2) Cultural 
DynaMiCs 131, 132 (1999).
23 peerenbooM, supra note 9, at 9.
24 peerenbooM, supra note 9, at Chapters 2 and 3.
25 Defoort and Peerenboom, supra note 22, at 132. 
26 peerenbooM, supra note 9, at 47-48.
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an ‘essentialist’ view of  reality that leads to ‘concretisation’ of  general policies 
(that is, the working out of  policy implementation details after the promulgation 
in formal law and policy of  higher-level general principles). Hintzen argues that 
owing to these three aspects of  Chinese culture, “[formal] law cannot fulfil the 
same abstract, general and directly binding role as it does on the basis of  western 
scholasticism” and in fact never did play such a role in China.27
Such studies usefully demonstrate the by now well-canvassed point that if  
rule of  law is to develop in China, it will be in a particularly Chinese context and 
so will have particularly Chinese characteristics. Having regard to the impact of  
cultural factors on the modern Chinese legal system is an imperative aspect of  
a meaningful depiction of  law’s role, whether the role is labelled ‘rule by law’ or 
‘rule of  law’. However, a potential shortcoming of  such a law/culture framework 
is that it presumes that, so long as the context is accounted for, it is possible to 
identify ideas, concepts and institutions comparable to those of  the West, which 
we might term ‘legal’.28 With regard to the aforementioned meta-narrative of  
China’s developing legal system, a narrative defined and coloured in recent decades 
by central state attention to the law and order nexus, this does not seem to be 
a problematic assumption. However, in looking at the local ideas, concepts and 
institutions of  China, an approach is needed which allows for the possibility that 
a different type of  ideology may also be relevant. 
In this vein, Thomas Stephens, in his study of  the Imperial Shanghai Mixed 
Court,29 questions whether a law-centric framework is apposite in the traditionally 
disciplinarian context of  China. Stephens presents two contrasting modes of  
social control, the “adjudicative/legal,” and the “disciplinary/parental”, arguing 
that traditional Chinese justice fits the latter mould more than the former. The 
Western adjudicative/legal model involves “rigid, universal, specific imperatives” 
applied to all equally.30 In a disciplinarian system, order excludes law, and is rather 
characterised as “the harmony of  pattern arising spontaneously from within. 
27 Hintzen, supra note 9, at 178. 
28 stepHens, supra note 13, at viii.
29 This court’s mandate was to apply Chinese law to Chinese residents of  a foreign enclave 
in Shanghai.
30 stepHens, supra note 13, at 4.
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The idea of  predetermined, rigid, universal imperatives governing conduct 
and imposing order from without is not there”.31 This denotes more than just 
paternalism, but a uniquely Chinese presentation of  self, both individually and 
collectively, as embedded in a “group-hierarchical society” in which “right conduct 
consists in doing what is commanded”,32 and the emphasis is on “[o]bedience to 
superiors in a hierarchy of  authority”.33 Stephens argues that a disciplinary theory 
is necessary and appropriate when studying order in China because 
it provides an alternative framework of  principles in terms of  which a much more credible 
and convincing picture of  Chinese processes of  dispute resolution and the enforcement of  
order can be projected than any that is possible in terms of  the principles, concepts, and 
vocabulary of  familiar Western legal systems.34
Stephens’ thesis demonstrates the important, and often overlooked, point 
that there are different ways of  thinking about order in China, some of  which 
do not coincide with the Western underpinnings of  law, legality and rule of  law. 
Stephens’ theory is an important contribution to my theoretical framework, for 
while I agree with Geor Hintzen that “cultural values are of  determining influence 
for the way law is viewed in a society”,35 it is important that the question of  how 
law is viewed is approached without constraining theoretical preconceptions.
iii. caSe Study – gRaSSRootS oRPhanage ngoS
In the remainder of  this article, I turn to the question of  how law, order and 
legal culture are experienced and evidenced locally in the interactions between 
local officials and ‘illegal’36 grassroots NGOs engaged in orphan care. Through 
in-depth interviews and participant observation, I gathered data from a particular 
field of  grassroots NGO activity, namely the care of  orphaned and abandoned 
children. What follows is an introduction to the landscape of  Chinese NGOs 
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 5.
34 Id. at xii.
35 Id. at 167.
36 Terms such as ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ are definitionally problematic in the current context, 
where the laws and rules relating to unregistered orphanages are ambiguous. The term 
‘illegal NGO’ is used as a shorthand which includes quasi- or non-legal organizations, 
as discussed further below.
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generally and non-government orphanages more specifically, and the grassroots 
orphanages which comprise the case studies for this research project.
1. China’s Civil Society Landscape
The concept of  a non-governmental organization is, in China, loaded with 
meanings not necessarily apparent or obvious to outside observers. The literal 
translation of  ‘non-governmental organization’ is feizhengfuzuzhi, which can also 
be taken to mean ‘anti-government organization’ (fei meaning both ‘non’ and 
‘anti’), a linguistic nuance which aptly reflects the perceived tension between 
the emergence of  civil society organizations and the preservation of  China’s 
communist political ideology. Through the promulgation, beginning in 1989 
with the regulations on ‘Social Organisations’ (shehuituanti), of  a number of  new 
laws relating to charities and NGOs, the Chinese government has evinced its 
concern with maintaining tight control over the newly emerging state-society 
relationship,37 and both domestic and foreign NGOs continue to face significant 
practical obstacles to achieving recognized legal status despite a clear framework 
providing for their registration. In fact, given the tight control maintained by 
government over NGOs, whether ‘civil society’ can be said to have emerged in 
China is debatable. Chinese NGOs operate on a spectrum of  autonomy from 
state bureaucracy, with government-organised NGOs functioning at one end of  
the spectrum and grassroots NGOs at the other. Government-organised NGOs 
(GONGOs, also known as officially organised/top-down NGOs, as compared 
to popular/bottom-up NGOs) are “citizen-led efforts from organisations that 
are nominally independent, but in fact are often established by and retain close 
ties with the state”.38 A great deal of  ‘cascading’ oversight of  bottom-up NGOs 
occurs using top-down NGOs as intermediaries. The demarcation and isolation 
of  ‘state’ from ‘society’ is thus particularly problematic in China, where so many 
‘social’ organisations are in fact a creation of  the state. 
37 Qiusha Ma, The Governance of  NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?, 31 
nonproFit anD Voluntary seCtor q. 306 (2002). See also Jillian Ashley and Pengyu He, 
Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” 
NGOs in China Today, 26 boston uniVersity international law journal 29 (2008); 
Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: The Development of  Social Organisations in China, 161 CHina 
q. 124 (2000), in relation to Social Organisations in particular.
38 Ashley and He, supra note 37, at 32.
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It remains the case that most NGOs in China today, and the majority of  the 
interviewees for the current study, are not registered with the relevant government 
department (Ministry of  Civil Affairs, hereafter ‘MCA’), and can be described as 
unofficial, grassroots NGOs (caogenzuzhi). According to the MCA, at the end of  
2008 there were approximately 415,000 registered NGOs in China,39 most of  
which are widely assumed to be GONGOs. In interview, one provincial Charity 
Federation Director told me that the numbers of  unregistered charities in China are 
‘comparatively low’.40 However, it is commonly estimated that there are between 
two and eight million NGOs in China, meaning the vast majority are operating 
outside of  the formal legal structure.41
2. Orphanage Grassroots NGOs: History and Operations
The grassroots NGOs interviewed for the current study all care for orphaned 
and abandoned children. Since the Cultural Revolution, during which time foreign 
mission workers were ejected from the country and private orphanages either 
closed or appropriated by the state, presumptively only government organisations 
have the right to operate orphanages or foster homes in China. Today, however, 
there are a large number of  non-government orphanages and homes caring for 
children across China.42 These organisations constitute an alternative, parallel and 
39 CHina npo website, http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/listTitle.do?dictionid=2201 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009). According to Ashley and He (supra note 37, at 41), these 
figures represent a significant number of  new registrations since 2006, when there 
were 186,000 Social Organizations, 159,000 Private Non-Enterprise Units (PNEUs) 
and 1,138 Foundations [these are the three types of  registered civil society-type entities 
available under the Chinese NGO framework].
40 Interview with Xi Jieming, Director, Shandong Charity Federation, in Jinan, China (Sep. 
21, 2009).
41 Interview with Madam Leng, founder and director of  Star Village, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 9, 2010) - estimates between 2 and 7 million actual NGOs in existence; Interview 
with Father Thomas, founder of  Chinese orphanage support organization Wagner 
Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010) - estimates between 6 and 8 million non-registered 
or commercially-registered NGOs.
42 The surveyed sector includes both Chinese-run orphanages, caring for children directly 
surrendered into their care, and foster homes, most of  which are run by foreigners, 
caring for children fostered from state institutions for short or long term treatment and 
guardianship. This article focuses solely on the former; see Anna High, China’s Orphan 
Welfare System: Laws, Policies and Filled Gaps 8 u. oF pennsylVania east asia l. reV. 126 
(2013)] for an overview of  both types.
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often unacknowledged system of  care to the state-operated welfare institutions, 
which care for only a small fraction of  China’s orphans.43
There are no official estimates on the number of  unregistered private 
orphanages in China. Many are associated with the underground Catholic church; 
many have experienced disapproval and harassment from local officials due to the 
nature of  their work. All of  my seven primary case study orphanages (introduced 
below) were able to list at least three or four other private orphanages in their 
respective provinces of  which they were aware, despite the fact that networks of  
mutual support among the homes appeared weak to non-existent. My informants 
also included two Western individuals, Father Thomas and Charles Kramer, who 
represent organisations involved with advocacy and support of  Catholic private 
orphanages across China – both estimate there are hundreds of  orphanages run by 
Catholics alone across China. It is clear from my fieldwork that informal orphanage 
operations are abundant in the provinces visited, as actual or perceived gaps in 
the state’s provision of  welfare result in efforts to supplement the formal system 
with bottom-up, local initiatives. Such private orphanages are very often founded 
out of  necessity following the discovery of  one or more abandoned children in a 
particular region. This is particularly typical of  church-run orphanages – it is very 
common for abandoning parents to leave their children near church buildings, 
or for children found in public spaces such as bus stops or by the roadside to be 
brought by those who find them to known Christians in the area, in the absence 
of  state-provided alternatives. Over time, large numbers of  foundlings come to be 
cared for by overwhelmed parishioners, before being brought together under the 
supervision of  church leaders for central care. Other orphanages are established 
as a planned response to a perceived need in one’s community, becoming, over 
time and as word spreads, regular recipients of  abandoned children.
43 According to Chinese government statistics, as of  2006 there were 573 000 orphaned 
children in China, of  which 66 000 are in the care of  state welfare institutes (Guany
ujiaqinggu’erjiuzhugongzuo de yijian [Joint Ministerial Opinion on Strengthening Orphan 
Relief], Ministry of  Civil Affairs et al. 2006). It may be that the total number of  orphans 
is under-reported, given that many orphaned and abandoned children, including those 
resident in most of  the private orphanages interviewed, do not possess hukou [residency 
permits] and are thus unlikely to be included in official statistics. 
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There appear to be a number of  reasons why the children at private 
orphanages do not end up being cared for in the state welfare system. Many 
rural areas are prohibitively distant from the nearest state orphanage, most of  
which are in urban locations, and theoretically only service urban populations. 
One of  the case study orphanages, Star Village, cares for children of  prisoners, 
who are, in any case, not eligible for upkeep in welfare institutes. Dr Shang, the 
leading scholar on China’s vulnerable children, notes that while “theoretically, the 
state is the sole welfare provider to vulnerable children in China”, at the same 
time “state policy in rural areas is not to take direct responsibility for supporting 
[vulnerable] children” where, again theoretically, such children are cared for by 
“traditional family and kinship networks, and wubao”.44 The actual experience in 
rural areas, however, does not always marry to the theory of  central policies. Dr 
Shang explains that although many rural orphaned children are protected by wubao, 
there are a number of  deficiencies in the system that render it often ineffectual 
and inadequate as a means of  care provision.45 Kinship and wubao networks are 
proving inadequate to protect rural vulnerable children; in the absence of  state 
institutions, grassroots private orphanages have therefore evolved to address in 
part such inadequacies.46
3. Methodology and Data
This research project is the culmination of  numerous trips to various foster 
homes and orphanages in China carried out between 2005 and 2010. Using those 
homes as a starting point of  contact, the subjects of  study were approached 
44 Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaoming Wu and Haiyan Li, Social Policy, Social Gender and the Problem 
of  Infant Abandonment in China, youtH stuDies 4, 126 (2005).Nongcunwubao or the ‘Five 
Guarantees’ is a ‘rural community-based welfare system that provides the five guarantees 
of  free food, clothes, fuel, health services, and education or funeral arrangements as 
appropriate for the elderly, sick and disabled as well as for orphans who are not only 
unable to look after themselves but also have no one legally responsible for their welfare: 
Xiaoyuan Shang, Looking for a Better Way to Care for Children: Cooperation between the State 
and Civil Society in China, 76(2) soCial serViCe reView 203, 206 (2002).
45 Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaming Wu and Yue Wu, Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children: The 
Missing Role of  the State, tHe CHina quarterly 122 (2005).
46 Further, a number of  my informants believe that even where a state orphanage is 
within reach of  an abandoning parent, some are reluctant to leave their children at such 
institutions due to a fear of  being caught by the state and sanctioned for the crime of  
abandonment.
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based on personal introductions. This eventually led to contacts with Chinese-run 
orphanages.47 The bulk of  my data was gathered on two research trips, in 2009 
and 2010.48 The seven case study orphanages which informed the current article 
are introduced in the table below.
Pseudonym Location* Description Children
Guanghui Beijing/Hebei Catholic church-run private 
orphanage
90
Our Lady’s Beijing/Hebei Catholic church-run private 
orphanage
113
Good Shepherd Shanxi Catholic church-run private 
orphanage (closed in 2008)
40
Home of  Joy Shanxi Church-run private orphanage 75
Rainbow House Beijing/Hebei Previously church-run private 
orphanage, now recognized by 
MCA as official provider in area
79
Star Village Beijing/Hebei Part of  national network of  homes 
caring for children of  long-term 
prisoners
130
Chen Anhui Anhui Individual-run private orphanage 200
Following interviews with representatives of  various private orphanages in 
2009, in 2010 I spent several weeks each at Guanghui and Our Lady’s Home for the 
Handicapped, both of  which are homes for orphans and foundlings run by nuns 
of  the unofficial Catholic church, in order to better understand day-to-day life and 
the experiences of  resident children and sisters. In addition, in-depth interviews 
were carried out, on both field trips, with representatives of  five other Chinese-run 
private orphanages. Home of  Joy, Rainbow House and Good Shepherd Home 
are also associated with underground churches, although Good Shepherd is no 
longer in operation as its managers recently moved to Beijing to pursue a foster 
home model. Rainbow House, located in a town very near to Guanghui, is an 
47 Private Chinese orphanages, and particularly those associated with underground 
churches, are, for reasons explored below, very often wary of  associations which could 
attract the attention of  local authorities, making access difficult, and largely dependent on 
guanxi (relationships, connections) with trusted, long-standing friends of  the orphanage 
concerned.
48 See Appendix A for list of  interviews.
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important case study, as the orphanage has succeeded in establishing a partnership 
with the MCA, following years of  independent, unsupervised operations. The 
remaining homes are not connected with religious communities – Star Village is 
a home for the children of  long-term prisoners, and its founder, Madam Leng, 
has actively sought government support and cooperation for many years since 
its founding; Chen Anhui is an independent orphanage, supported by a network 
of  expatriate volunteers. 
iv. findingS – goveRnMent ReguLation of the SectoR
Most Chinese private orphanages operate without formal registration as 
charitable organisations or welfare homes, often without legal status and without 
any kind of  formal state regulation or oversight. Further, they are operating in a 
field (privately-run, unregistered institutions for orphans) the legality of  which is 
ambiguous at best. Dr Shang in Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children cites central 
policy as stipulating that only state-run welfare institutes may lawfully care for 
orphaned and abandoned children in China, based on an interview with an official 
from the Ministry of  Civil Affairs.49 It is somewhat problematic to make such a 
broad statement – ‘government’ is a cumbersome entity in China that does not 
always present a unified front. However, certainly the evidence of  both Chinese 
and foreign informants was that local and provincial level officials frequently refer 
to their operations as ‘illegal’ or ‘not allowed’, usually on the basis of  an assertion 
that only the government can care for Chinese orphans.50
An apparent dilemma thus arises. It is beyond the capability of  local 
governments to take over the responsibility of  caring for the children currently 
housed in private orphanages. However, the existence of  such homes is legally 
and, at times, politically problematic. The passive approach of  local government 
is to ignore the formal legal rules and allow private orphanages to play a role, 
often significant, in child welfare. Despite their lack of  legal status, complex 
transactional relationships exist between local government and the operators of  
private orphanages, and the expectations of  such operators appear to be met 
49 Supra note 45, at 122.
50 For a more comprehensive review of  statutory references to the care of  orphans, see 
[forthcoming UPenn EALR article – Fall 2012].
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fairly regularly, as legal rules are marginalised in favour of  informal norms and 
processes. A combination of  government oversight and back-turning exists in 
this regulatory space, widely spoken of  in China as the ‘one eye open, one eye 
closed’ approach.
Before presenting the empirical evidence relating to government interaction 
with the Chinese private orphanages, the unwieldy and layered character of  
Chinese government must be noted, as well as the fact that ‘government’ is 
itself  a contentious and ill-defined notion due to the nature of  its bureaucracy, 
and due to the blurred state/society boundary that the GONGO system entails. 
‘Government’ in China is an exceptionally cumbersome entity, with vast internal 
political space. Vertically, such space often results in de facto devolution of  central 
powers to provincial and local levels, with great variance in implementation 
of  central policies, including, notably, in relation to regulation of  the NGO 
sector (birth planning policy implementation is another pertinent example).51 
Horizontally, the potential for inconsistency and confusion in relation to policy 
and responsibilities among departments and bureaus is great, and the effect of  this 
confusion at the level of  implementation is compounded by the power of  central 
departments and Party offices to issue circulars with equivalent or superior status 
to codified laws.52 In light of  such multidimensional space, it is overly reductionist 
to construct ‘the state’ or ‘government’ as a monolithic and homogeneous entity. 
Accordingly, it may be difficult to draw inferences about ‘government’ attitudes 
and intentions. In presenting evidence of  discrepancies between law and practice, 
and the different experiences of  the case studies in their interaction with state 
officials, account must be taken of  this cumbersome nature of  government in 
China and the concomitant potential for disconnect and confusion between 
different levels of  government.
51 Seekay joHnson, wanting a DaugHter, neeDing a son (Yeong&Yeong Book Co. 
2004), at 163 (noting how fierce resistance to central birth planning policy at local level 
led to marked differences in implementation); and Haiyan Li, Xiaoyuan Shang and 
Jianpeng Cheng, An Analysis of  Reasons Behind the Abandonment of  Orphans and Disabled 
Children in Beijing (Beijingshi Gucan Ertong Bei Yiqi De Yuanyin Fenxi), beijing soCial 
sCienCes 4, 154–155 (2004). 
52 See CHak kwan CHan, king lun ngok anD DaViD pHillips, soCial poliCy in CHina: 
DeVelopMent anD well-being (The Policy Press: Bristol, 2008) at 9; Xiaorong Li, 
License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s 
Family-Planning Program, 8 yale journal oF law anD FeMinisM 145, 150 (1996).
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Turning to the nature of  interactions between orphanages and government 
officials in particular, one must keep in mind the different priorities and 
preoccupations which dominate the different vertical layers of  state institutions, 
as well as the different political cultures which operate in different localities 
across China. For example, Will Peters, an American businessman who founded 
a grassroots foster home for Chinese orphans, and has worked extensively with 
Catholic orphanages for many years, postulated that the overarching priority of  
central government is ‘the extent to which they complete the theoretical plan – 
their laws, regulations and policies, even though they are kind of  a construct’.53 
It is arguable, and supported by the empirical findings about the nature of  
private orphanage relationships with officials and departments, that the central 
government is generally more concerned with appearances, and the symbolism 
of  a legal/regulatory landscape which ostensibly confines the care of  orphans to 
state orphanages. We might speculate that such a concern with an appearance of  
control over orphanages relates to the potentially high political cost, in terms of  
the legitimacy of  birth planning policies, that would be involved in acknowledging 
activities broadly associated with the problem of  infant abandonment, such as 
private care of  foundlings, or admitting that the problem is of  such a scale that 
private homes are apparently needed to supplement state welfare.54 The rhetoric 
of  central control over all church and NGO activities would also appear to be in 
need of  protection.  Local officials, on the other hand, seem to be negotiating a 
delicate balance between on the one hand the top-down pressure to maintain at 
least the appearance of  compliance with formal law and policy, and commitment 
to the ideas they symbolise, and on the other hand the bottom-up pressure of  
pragmatic considerations.55 The evidence from the field is that there is a broad 
correlation between formal registration (dengji/zhuce) of  private orphanages and 
engagement with provincial/central level authorities; whereas informal recognition 
53 Interview with China Orphan Relief  founder/CEO, in Beijing, (Aug. 25 2009).
54 The existence of  private orphanages is seen by many in the field as a partial testament 
to the true extent of  abandonment in China, a phenomenon the Chinese government 
has a vested interest in underemphasising due to its nexus with China’s controversial 
birth planning policies.
55 For an excellent sociological account of  the resultant “symbiosis” between the state 
and grassroots NGOs, see Anthony Spires, Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an 
Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of  China’s Grassroots NGOs, 117(1) aMeriCan 
j. oF soCiology 1 (2011).
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(chengren/renke) and oversight (which encompasses a spectrum of  relations from 
supportive to hostile, including shutting homes down or heavily impinging their 
ability to continue functioning) occurs at the local level. The discussion below is 
arranged accordingly.
1. Attitudes to Legality: Ideological and Functional
The recognition/registration distinction was prominent in the discourse of  
orphanage operators. It became apparent early on in the field that a legal/illegal 
distinction is very rarely drawn in the language used by interviewees, meaning that 
the legal/illegal binary presupposed by many studies of  China’s law/practice gaps 
is not entirely apposite in the local Chinese context. Questions about whether 
private orphanage work is regarded by those in the field as ‘hefa’ (compliant with 
law), ‘feifa’ (contrary to law) or having no relation to law would almost always elicit 
discussions about the various ways, formal and informal, in which government is 
willing to engage with the private orphanages. This appeared indicative of  a general 
lack of  preoccupation with ‘legality’ in either an empirical or ideological sense, 
and was a notable point of  contrast with foreign interviewees, who seemed on 
the whole more articulate on the issue of  legality of  non-government orphanage 
work. Indeed ‘legality’ is, empirically, a difficult notion to pin down in this area 
of  activity, and, given the vague state of  the legislative framework relating to 
Chinese NGOs, is much more problematic to define here than is often the case 
in many Western56 contexts.
Ideologically, there was a far greater emphasis observable in the field (which 
is mirrored in the scholarship of  Chinese NGO specialists),57 on the attainment 
of  legitimacy than legality. Legitimacy is defined by Gao Bingzhong, an influential 
Chinese NGO scholar, as “being recognised or accepted because of  being judged 
56 In using terms such as ‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’, I am in agreement with Diane Hoffman 
and Guoping Zhao, who argue that such usage can lead to “unwarranted generalization, 
leading to monolithic comparisons that erase internal differences”, but that they might 
nevertheless be carefully used as ‘heuristic devices to illustrate broad cultural contrasts’ 
(Diane Hoffman and Guoping Zhao, Global Convergence and Divergence in Childhood Ideologies 
and the Marginalization of  Children,ineDuCation anD soCial inequality in tHe global 
Culture 3, 3 (Joseph Zajda, Karen Biraimah and William Gaudelli eds., 2008). 
57 ngos in CHina anD europe, ch. 2–7 (Yuwen Li ed., Ashgate, 2011).
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or believed to be in conformity with certain rules”. This definition accords 
with Suchman’s, widely adopted in Western organisational theory scholarship: 
“Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of  an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of  norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.58 Of  course, semantically and 
conceptually the concepts of  legitimacy and legality are closely related, with the 
former often being used in a particular sense to mean ‘conformable to law’ (the 
more general sense being ‘conformable to rules or standards’) – this is also the 
case when one considers the Chinese terms for legitimacy, heli and hefa, literally 
‘complying with truth/reason’ and ‘complying with law’ respectively. However 
while compliance with legal rules is one aspect of  legitimacy, as will be explored 
herein, I argue that legality (or what we might call ‘legal legitimacy’) is not of  
central importance vis-à-vis grassroots Chinese NGOs. It is thus useful to 
consider other aspects of  legitimacy that may not be contingent on or related to 
an organisation’s legal status. In this vein, Gao helpfully deconstructs legitimacy 
into four aspects: political legitimacy, social legitimacy, administrative legitimacy 
and legal legitimacy.59 Political legitimacy depends on the political correctness 
of  an organisation’s agenda and actions. Social legitimacy refers to congruence 
with the expectations and norms of  society, and accordingly being recognized 
and accepted socially. Administrative legitimacy involves being recognised and 
accepted by a bureaucratic system, while legal legitimacy denotes recognition and 
formalisation through legal institutions (such as, for example, legislation relating 
to NGO registration). These are influential interpretive concepts in Chinese NGO 
literature, which raises the question of  how much value is placed on the various 
58 Mark Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20(3) aCaDeMy 
oF ManageMent reView 571, 574 (1995).
59 Bingzhong Gao, The Question of  Legitimacy of  Social Organisations, CHina soCial sCienCes 
2 (2000), translated in Junkui Han, International NGOs in China: Current Situation, Impacts 
and Response of  the Chinese Government, inngos in CHina anD europe, 35 (Yuwen Li 
ed., Ashgate, 2011). Organisational theory literature includes numerous different 
‘legitimacy typologies’, such as resource/moral/cultural (David Ahlstrom and Gary 
Bruton, Learning from Successful Local Private Firms in China: Establishing Legitimacy, 15(4) 
tHe aCaDeMy oF ManageMent exeCutiVe 72, (2001)) and pragmatic/moral/cognitive 
(Suchman, supra note 58). While organisational and business management scholarship 
has some relevance to NGO studies, and recognizing the overlap of  other legitimacy 
‘types’ with Gao’s four categories of  legitimacy, Gao’s model is adopted herein due to 
its proven aptness vis-à-vis the study of  Chinese NGOs.  
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facets of  legitimacy, including but not limited to legal legitimacy (or legality), by the 
various actors, both state and non-state, at the level of  grassroots NGO activity.
The idea of  legality as a source of  enhanced legitimacy deriving from 
some measure of  formal, documented interaction with and approval from state 
authorities was lacking among Chinese interviewees in the sector; that is to say, 
legal legitimacy was not considered a necessary aspect of  or precondition to 
attaining political, social or administrative legitimacy. On the other hand, many 
interviewees would raise the higher normative force of  a felt moral calling to care 
for orphans, when the legality of  their work was discussed – for example: “Home 
of  Joy is completely faith-based – we operate strongly based on what we believe 
in. We want to do what is best for the kids, we’re not necessarily trying to get 
around the system”.60 This perhaps indicates that legality is not wholly a matter 
of  no concern, but rather is subordinated to this more pressing consideration. 
None of  the interviewees appeared to regard their work as illegal, although all 
acknowledged their lack of  registration, and, in many cases, recognition, and were 
unwilling to state equivocally that their work is approved or permitted:
I don’t think they think about themselves as illegal. They are doing something because the 
government has not arrived to do it themselves. Society has this need, so somebody has to 
take over the care of  the abandoned children, and this was not being done by government. 
Sure, the government says that only the state can care for orphans. But caring for people 
is not illegal.61
[Sister Qin, founder, when asked if  Guanghui’s work is legal] So it is contradictory…we 
hope the Chinese government can soon replace this thought towards this group of  people, 
we hope they can really understand that we are rescuing children…We hope that the laws 
will improve and strengthen more and more. Their law says this – that orphanages are 
government’s responsibility, but implementation is at the grassroots.62
[Madam Meng, founder of  Huiling Disability Services, on unregistered NGOs generally] 
It’s like the red/green/yellow of  traffic lights. We’re in the yellow light zone.63
60 Interview with volunteer coordinator of  Home of  Joy, in Shanghai, (Oct. 13, 2009).
61 Interview with Guanghui project manager, in Hebei, (Jul. 9, 2010).
62 Interview with Sister Qing, manager/co-founder of  Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
63 Interview with Madam Meng, Huiling, in Beijing, (Aug. 5, 2010).
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When the issue was framed in terms of  relationships with state officials, on 
the other hand, there was evidence that all interviewees had contemplated the 
functional and instrumental consequences of  legality/legal status or lack thereof, 
both advantageous and otherwise. Broadly, the three main areas in which increased 
government engagement with the private orphanages could potentially lead to 
changes in operational outcomes are funding, the problem of  hukou [residency 
permits] for children of  unknown parentage, and the regulation of  standards of  
care. The language used by interviewees is most telling here – generally, the idea 
of  recognition of  their work (chengren) was spoken of  as desirable; registration in a 
formal/legal sense (dengji/zhuce) generally was not, and questions about the latter 
were often treated as referring to the former. The preoccupation with recognition 
seemed to equate with a desire for acknowledgement of  the charitable, benevolent 
and philanthropic intentions of  the homes, the hard work of  the volunteers who 
staff  them, and the general legitimacy of  their work despite a lack of  ‘papers’ or 
formal association with government. More specifically, most operators expressed 
a belief  that recognition by local authorities would lead to better financial support, 
and assistance in resolution of  the hukou issue. ‘Registration’, on the other hand, 
seemed to be tied up with historically problematic relations with ‘authority’ and 
‘government’, as explained by two foreigners with many years’ experience with 
the Catholic orphanages: 
The sisters are not used to dealing with the people of  government. History tells them that 
always they were abused by government [as Christians]. I tell them, but you are doing social 
work – you are taking care of  children. You have to be stronger with them! You have to ask 
them for help. But they are afraid to go to the government, afraid to go to the [GONGO] 
Disability Federation – they’re afraid to knock on doors. This story, this history, is on their 
shoulders. They’re so afraid.64
Government is an enemy, because of  their control of  religion, rather than a partner in 
their provision of  services. They’re not looking to engage with government. Leave me alone. 
You have nothing to give me except trouble…From a church point of  view, there’s no going 
to the government asking for engagement. It’s more ‘We’ve identified a need, we will get on 
with it and it won’t involve the government’.65
64 Interview with visiting Italian physiotherapist, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 10, 2010).
65 Interview with Father Thomas, Wagner Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010).
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With two exceptions, the interviewees were noticeably unconcerned with 
their lack of  legal status, other than insofar as it has an impact on the hukou and 
funding issues raised below – this ambivalence is exemplified in the following 
quote from Sister Chen at Our Lady’s:
Ah, being unregistered…it’s not like they will say ‘you’re unregistered so we are going to 
trouble you’…it’s just that sometimes, I feel that the children do not enjoy the rights they 
should enjoy, it seems like they are lacking a little.66
Moreover, the language used by many of  those homes indicated that increased 
government oversight is associated with the imposition of  external, hard-to-
meet standards, a disincentive to seeking legality. Father Thomas, speaking of  
unsupervised Catholic orphanages generally, explained that legality is viewed 
as unbeneficial because “[i]t would just be mafan [trouble]. It would give poor 
managers more trouble. I don’t see how it would be onerous for good managers, 
though”. Home of  Joy, for example, expressed concern about whether ‘legalisation’ 
would be in their best interests, as that would mean many state regulations would 
become applicable. Others similarly expressed concern that ‘legalisation’ could in 
fact hinder their ability to carry out their work free from government interference 
and regulation – “Operating unregistered works well for us – if  we were regulated, 
we couldn’t do what is needed on the ground. We want to make things happen”.67 
The only time interviewees expressed concern about the lack of  standards of  care 
in their field of  activity was, on occasion, in relation to other homes. 
Only two of  the homes, Star Village and Guanghui, expressed frustration 
regarding their inability to attain registration. Given that the other homes perceived 
a connection between registration and the imposition of  external standards, it is 
relevant that both Star Village and Guanghui also expressed greater confidence 
in their standards of  care and transparency of  operations. Star Village referred 
to this as a ‘self-discipline’ issue – given the organisational and administrative 
capacity of  this national movement, it is unsurprising that they did not believe 
registration would greatly impact on their work (other than perhaps by enhancing 
their social legitimacy, and thus assisting with community fundraising efforts).
66 Interview with Sister Chen, co-founder of  Our Lady’s, in Hebei, (Jul. 21, 2010).
67 Interview with volunteer coordinator, Chen Anhui, in Shanghai, (Oct. 4, 2009).
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2. Central and Provincial Regulation (Formal)
‘Our government, they won’t acknowledge us. We go and knock on doors, but not a single 
department will act for us. They will not pay us any attention. They say it would give them 
too much trouble’.68
Dr Shang uses Guanghui as an example of  the difficulties faced by Chinese-
run private orphanages in achieving formal registration. Although established in 
1988, it was not until 1994 that an incoming director decided to address Guanghui’s 
lack of  legal status (and the attendant lack of  hukou for resident children – below) 
by seeking registration: 
Since 1994, Nun Qin has written more than 70 letters to several government departments: 
civil affairs (minzheng), religion (zongjiao), united front (tong zhang), public security 
(gongan), political consultative conference (zhengxie) and people’s congresses (renda), at 
different levels. Most departments were friendly and sympathetic to her efforts. However, for 
various reasons, none of  them had the power to give the home a formal registration within 
the current legal framework, which stipulates that only government organisations have the 
right to run children’s homes and that it is illegal for private individuals and organisations 
to run such facilities. Children cared for by [Guanghui] have to grow up without formal 
registration. The oldest ‘child’ in the home is now 20, but he still cannot obtain a formal 
registration (hukou). Nun Qin has also tried to argue with the local civil affairs department 
that if  it cannot give her home legal status, the government should take over the home and 
look after the children. This suggestion was ignored. Although both the local government 
and the church know that [Guanghui] has no legal status, the local government has no 
intention of  closing it or taking over its administration. To assume responsibility the local 
government would have to provide caring services to 87 disabled children.69
Although the practical ramifications of  operating as a non-entity are 
significant, among the seven Chinese private orphanages interviewed, five have 
no recognised legal personality in China. Father Thomas and Charles Kramer, 
familiar with the majority of  church-based orphanages in Eastern China, both 
report that none of  which they know have been able to attain registration. Only 
Rainbow House and Star Village have any formal legal status in China, and of  
the remaining homes, only Guanghui has actively sought registration, which is 
68 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
69 Shang, Wu and Wu, supra note 45, at 131. 
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reflective of  the generally ambivalent attitude to ‘legality’ observed in the sector. 
In none of  the cases was government approval sought as a precursor to beginning 
orphanage operations. Rather, attention to formal permission and sanction of  
operations, if  given, was always an afterthought, often given only after years of  
operation demonstrated the practical shortcomings of  working outside of  the 
state welfare system. Star Village, which has all but given up on NGO registration 
and is instead registered as a commercial enterprise, indicated that it was only 
after many years of  operating as a non-entity that they turned their attention to 
‘legalising’ operations by obtaining some sort of  official status in China; Rainbow 
House, similarly, struck up a partnership with government after two years of  
operating as a non-entity.
Central policy on the establishment of  private orphanages is, as introduced 
above, ambiguous at best, and complicated in the case of  church-based 
orphanages, where in many cases the legal status of  the associated church is itself  
questionable.70 Dr Shang’s statement that only state-run institutions may lawfully 
care for abandoned and orphaned children in China must be qualified, in light 
of  the Social Welfare Institutions Interim Measures,71 which appear to provide a 
mechanism for privately-run orphanages to be established on condition of  being 
granted a ‘certificate of  approval’.72 Further, given the lack of  a definitive, express 
prohibition on caring for orphans privately, it would appear that a second pathway 
70 A large number of  Chinese private orphanages are run by the Catholic church, which 
experienced decades of  persecution and suppression under Mao’s rule following the 
founding of  the PRC. The Vatican, during this time, called for the faithful in China to 
resist cooperation with the newly established Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association 
(the only state-approved meeting of  Catholics, and the leaders of  which denounced 
the Vatican), meeting in unapproved congregations in houses across China. In this 
way, the ‘underground’ Catholic church evolved. The public/underground distinction 
which originated during Mao’s rule continues today, although in a blurrier manner, 
and is mirrored in the Protestant church system. See, further, riCHarD MaDsen, CHina’s 
CatHoliCs: trageDy anD Hope in an eMerging CiVil soCiety (U. of  California Press, 
1998); Fenggang Yang, The Red, Black and Grey Markets of  Religion in China, 47 tHe 
soCiologiCal q. 93 (2006).
71 Shehuifulijigouguanlizanxingbanfa [Social Welfare Institutions Interim Measures], Ministry 
of  Civil Affairs, (Dec. 30, 1999).
72 Id. art. IX, although it is difficult to state definitively whether, on obtaining a certificate 
of  approval under the Measures, the home is then still considered to be independent, or 
effectively becomes appropriated into the state system, as the experience of  Rainbow 
House demonstrates (below). 
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to formal recognition for Chinese operators exists, namely that of  registering as a 
Private Non-Enterprise Unit (PNEU).73 However, for the time being, registration 
following either pathway is not a realistic option for most private orphanages, with 
the obstacles to both types of  formal approval being closely related. The first and 
most immediate barrier is that of  securing the cooperation and assistance of  a 
government department. At some point, an applicant orphanage must obtain the 
agreement of  a government department to act as a professional supervising unit 
(PSU – colloquially known as a ‘popo’ or mother-in-law) and to take on political, 
as well as some degree of  financial, responsibility for the actions and work of  the 
orphanage in question. This has proved impossible for many private orphanages, 
due to their lack of  political capital and financial resources. Secondly, in addition 
to the PSU/supervising department problem, both the Social Welfare Institutions 
Interim Measures, and the PNEU Regulation, include what in practice amount 
to minimum capital requirements which must be met.74 Other than Rainbow 
House, which appears to enjoy relative financial stability through private donors, 
none of  the interviewed orphanages are able to meet the financial criteria. A 
third barrier to registration is the lack of  administrative capacity to comply with 
the procedures and conditions – indeed, many of  the orphanages were unaware 
of  official processes for registration, let alone of  how they might go about an 
application (this is unsurprising given both the ambiguity of  government policy 
in the sector, and the administrative isolation of  the rural homes themselves). 
This last point is also made by Saich in relation to Social Organisations, noting 
that bottom-up initiatives by “poorer sectors of  society” are hampered by the 
NGO laws, which make registration “difficult for those groups that lack good 
connections and a relatively sophisticated organisational apparatus”.75
Although Rainbow’s manager, Mrs Moses, was unclear about under which 
state policy or measure their approval was granted, given that the relationship is 
with the MCA, it is likely that it was formalised according to the Social Welfare 
Institutions Interim Measures or a related implementing/subordinate regulation. 
This has led to their registration (zhuce), something none of  the other homes have 
73 Supra note 39. PNEU are defined as social organizations carrying out social service 
activities of  a non-profit nature: Minbanfeiqiyedanweidengjiguanlizanxingtiaoli [Provisional 
Regulation on Registration and Management of  Private Non-Enterprise Units], (Sep. 
25, 1998), art. 2. 
74 Supra, note 71, art VII; and supra, note 73, art 8.
75 Saich, supra note 37, at 132.
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been offered or able to achieve. Mrs Moses relates the evolution of  her orphanage’s 
ties with government as eventually progressing from a relationship of  suspicion 
and wariness, to one of  support and trust:
It is run by the church, but we have received very official government approval and recognition. 
They saw our good work, the rescue effort, that we help so many children, and our good 
operations, and now our relationship with the government is especially good…
…At first, the government did not understand our work, because it was a Christian 
orphanage. So they had opinions about this, and were always calling on us [to ask questions], 
and when we started up it was very difficult, there was a lot of  misunderstanding. It was 
very difficult to do our work in the face of  this opposition. As a new orphanage, you couldn’t 
yet see our achievements, we only had a few children. But slowly they came to feel that we 
were caring for the children very well. Step by step, they began to see that our work was of  
high quality, that we were helping to transform the children’s lives, and so over time, the 
relationship improved. They currently are very supportive of  us caring for even more children 
at the orphanage. They [local authorities] do not have any way of  rescuing these stray 
children, they can only rely on our home. And they see that if  these children were outside 
of  our home, living as strays, this would be a very big problem for the community. Currently 
[our city] only has our orphanage, there is no government orphanage, so they support us a 
lot – the Public Security Bureau, the Civil Affairs Bureau, the government officials, they 
are all extremely supportive, and hope we can continue to help even more children.
Government support of  Rainbow House appears to be limited in practice. 
Financially, government grants are nominal, and cover the living costs of  roughly 
one child per year. However a number of  important local officials provide 
private donations to Rainbow House, and photos of  such officials posing with 
the children they sponsor are displayed prominently in Rainbow House’s foyer. 
This is a telling indication of  the most valuable aspect of  Rainbow House’s ties 
with government, the security and social capital/practical advantages the home 
derives from its personal relationships or guanxi with local authority figures, and 
their public endorsement of  the home’s work. Mrs Moses spoke proudly of  the 
visits Rainbow House receives from such officials, and the strings they will pull for 
the home (for example, calling local schools to ensure the children are admitted). 
The other major advantage of  state approval is that the home itself  has a hukouor 
household registration, and thus is itself, in effect, a legal entity. This means that 
when children arrive at Rainbow without hukou, they can be registered with the 
Bureau of  Household Registration under the home’s hukou. 
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Star Village, the home for children of  prisoners (which is not affiliated with a 
church), has applied annually for fourteen years to its provincial MCA for registration 
as a charity, but has been unable to find a PSU willing to support its application. 
Guanghui faces the same obstacle, and Sister Qin, its manager, also expressed 
frustration and resignation at the government’s unwillingness to act as PSU:
We have been to them many times about this, but they just think it is too much trouble – they 
don’t want to supervise us. So we are caring for so many children, and every day we have to 
contend with so many issues, and we just don’t have the energy any more.76
The solution at Star Village has been to register as a commercial entity, 
something which is clearly incongruous but reportedly a very common creative 
alternative to achieving an operating structure conducive to the needs of  a 
charitable organization. In 2005, for example, the Tsinghua University NGO 
Research Centre estimated there were between 100 000 and 200 000 NGOs 
registered with the various State Administration of  Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC) bureaus nationwide.77 Anecdotally, the Chinese government is well aware 
of  the trend, and some interviewees consider commercial registration an advantage 
not only for practical reasons relating to banking, visas and finance, but also 
because business is ‘a language the Chinese understand’,78 the implication being 
that philanthropy and charity is still widely regarded with suspicion in Chinese 
society.  Commercial registration is often more convenient than acting as a non-
entity, and provides at least a veneer of  legitimacy to an organization by vesting 
it with legal personality. However such organisations are clearly acting outside 
the mandate of  their SAIC licenses, and possibly in violation of  policies and 
laws relating to the care of  orphans, meaning it is difficult to say whether such 
an approach renders the private orphanage in question any more ‘lawful’ than an 
orphanage operating as a non-entity.
Interviewees agreed that finding a PSU is difficult for private orphanages, 
but attributed this to different factors. Star Village’s campus director, a retired 
76 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder of  Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
77 Tina Qian and Nick Young, Rule on Names Starts to Close Door to NGO “Businesses”, CHina 
DeVelopMent brieF, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/74 (last accessed 
Jan. 14, 2010).
78 Interview with Chinese lawyer for foreign foster homes, in Beijing, (Sep. 5, 2009).
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Chinese army officer, believes their inability to find a PSU department relates to 
the fact that children of  prisoners, unlike orphans, are not a recognised class of  
welfare recipients; however generally (with the exception of  Rainbow House), the 
orphanages which do care for orphans and foundlings have had no more success 
than Star Village in securing registration. It appears that, apart from the fact that 
many orphanage operators themselves do not regard the pursuit of  registration 
(or indeed informal recognition) as a priority, registration prospects depend on the 
mafan (trouble/burden/labour) which potential supervisory departments believe 
would result from formalising their oversight of  the sector. 
A number of  factors are relevant here: the case of  Rainbow House 
demonstrates that where an orphanage is providing high-quality care for children 
in a transparent way, and provided that the home is demonstratively financially 
independent, and provided further that the department concerned is not 
threatened or wary of  the home’s operators for reasons relating to religious or 
political activities, it could in fact be politically favourable for such an orphanage 
to be formally recognized, and a partnership struck up, in response to needs left 
partially unaddressed by state-provided social welfare. The provincial MCA in 
Zhengmin, where Rainbow House is located, has effectively appropriated the 
work and outcomes of  Rainbow House, and the political benefits thereof, without 
concomitantly incurring any additional financial burden, and very little supervisory 
responsibility or accountability.
The perceived standard of  care being provided by various unregistered 
orphanages would thus seem to be a key factor in the registration prospects 
thereof, even beyond the obvious connection between care standards and the 
orphanage’s ability to meet the capital requirements. Charles Kramer, an Italian 
charity worker with many years of  experience aiding church-based private 
orphanages in improving their care standards, believes such standards are central 
to understanding state-orphanage relations, or lack thereof:
The government should somehow recognise the sector, but I can also see the fear of  government 
in managing structures that are very poorly run. How can they present themselves to the 
outside world, and say ‘this is recognised’, but leave the children in these conditions?…
You can understand government somehow now – if  they register these private homes, they 
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have to guarantee they are doing the right thing. So they have to find a way – to close, or to 
allow registration. Registration means more responsibility for government in terms of  the 
practices in these homes.79
If  the government register you, you become their responsibility. But if  you’re not registered, 
they can say “Oh it’s fine, you can’t blame me, it’s not my responsibility that things have 
gone wrong”.80
There is an obvious problem in a regulatory system in which those 
organisations providing the best quality care, and thus in less need of  supervisory, 
technical and financial support, are ‘legalised’, and those in which standards are 
low, and mortality rates high, are permitted to continue operating ‘under the 
radar’, but this appears to be the state of  the Chinese private orphanage system.81 
Of  course, the religious proclivities and history of  the associated church are also 
factors in the development of  orphanage-state relations, however the experience 
of  Rainbow House, also run by a church organisation, demonstrates that this 
is not necessarily an insurmountable barrier to formal registration. What seems 
more pivotal is the balance of, on the one hand, the political ‘face’ to be gained by 
adding well-run, relatively good-quality institutions to a provincial MCA bureau’s 
portfolio, and the administrative burden and political risk of  taking on some 
degree of  responsibility for the work thereof. Added to this is the potential for 
financial claims to be made upon a department which has granted approval to 
run an orphanage. Although Rainbow House, despite being registered for almost 
ten years, does not rely on government funds to continue its work, a number of  
other unsuccessful applicants attributed government’s unwillingness to oversee 
their work in part to an unwillingness to incur potential financial liability for their 
resident children.82
79 Ibid.
80 Interview with Beijing Normal University researcher, in Beijing, (Aug. 5, 2009).
81 A recent study of  ‘black’ (unregistered) schools for children of  migrants in Beijing 
reports a similar conundrum faced by such schools. The vast majority are unable to 
be registered as private schools, due to sub-standard conditions, but are unable to 
access funding to improve those conditions due to their lack of  registration: Charlotte 
Goodburn, Learning from Migrant Education: A Case Study of  the Schooling of  Rural Migrant 
Children in Beijing, 29 international journal oF eDuCational DeVelopMent 415 (2009).
82 Interview with co-managers, Good Shepherd, in Beijing, (Jul. 25, 2010); see also 
interviews with Our Lady’s, Will Peters and Mercy House.
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The political costs and benefits of  registration are, of  course, bound to vary 
greatly across and within provinces, depending on the combination of  a number 
of  factors. Regional emphasis on central policies is inconsistent across China, and 
appears to depend to a large extent on existing deficiencies in state provision of  
welfare at the provincial and local level, and the political and social pressure (or lack 
thereof) experienced by officials in relation to such shortcomings. Some provincial 
authorities were clearly much more willing than others to engage, in principle, 
with the private sector in the provision of  orphan services. This willingness often 
relates back, in turn, to the ‘flavour of  the times’ of  central policy and aspects of  
local political culture that may impact on interpretation of  these central policy 
shifts. For example, in the flurry of  activity that occurred after the Blue Sky 
Plan83 was promulgated, central policy was that state-run welfare institutions 
were to be increased in number, improved, expanded and, importantly, filled,84 
which in some provinces resulted in large numbers of  orphans being removed 
from privately run institutions. In other provinces, local officials apparently chose 
to maintain informal cooperation with and tolerance of  non-state institutions, 
contrary to central policy. Most commonly raised by interviewees as relevant to 
their registration failures were religious freedom (including the history of  the 
local state’s dealings with religious groups) and the related issue of  the ‘social 
capital’ (that is, the value of  one’s various social relations and networks) of  the 
orphanage’s founders, operators, supporters and associates (the director of  the 
Shandong Charity Federation admitted in interview that registration prospects are 
essentially dependent on having a ‘close relationship with government’).85 These 
factors are also highly relevant to interactions between local government and the 
orphanages, and are explored further below.
83 In June 2006, President Hu Jintao, while visiting a state orphanage, called for all children 
to be able to develop equally under the same blue sky, with orphans benefiting from 
the same opportunities as other children. In response and as a means of  implementing 
Hu’s call, the MCA soon after issued the Blue Sky Implementation Plan. The five-year 
program, commencing in 2006, aimed to invest central and local government funding 
in the construction of  new state orphanages and the improvement of  existing state 
orphanages across China. See Nationwide Plan for Better Care of  Orphans, CHina 
Daily, Dec. 29, 2006; Ertongfulijigoujianshelantianjihuashishifang’an [Child Welfare Institute 
Blue Sky Construction Plan Implementation Program], (Jan. 22, 2007).
84 Interview with Beijing Normal University researcher, in Beijing, (Aug. 5, 2009).
85 Interview with Xi Jieming, Director, Shandong Charity Federation, in Jinan, (Sep. 21, 
2009).
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In addition to the cost/benefit evaluation of  registration, it must also be 
added that it is possible that the continual refusal experienced by the applicant 
private orphanages is at least partly a result of  the horizontal space within the 
Chinese government, and the intersection of  different portfolio interests in the 
running of  the orphanages. This is particularly the case for orphanages run by 
local Catholic factions that themselves have a problematic history of  government 
relations. Sister Qin believes, for example, that the MCA is wary of  taking on 
responsibility for Guanghui through registration at least partly because traditionally 
oversight of  the underground Catholic church in their county is within the 
mandate of  the Religious Affairs Bureau; the Religious Affairs Bureau, on the 
other hand, is reportedly unwilling to oversee child welfare work, which comes 
under the MCA’s ambit.86 Whether it is genuinely unclear which department has 
responsibility to begin overseeing the operations of  private orphanages, or whether 
this intersection of  interests is a useful political tool for denying registration, is 
necessarily a matter of  speculation; it seems likely that there could be some degree 
of  truth in both assertions. 
3. Local Oversight (Informal)
Just as studies suggest that the majority of  NGOs in China are operating 
outside of  the supervisory framework of  the MCA and PSU system,87 so too 
examples of  formal registration and oversight of  private grassroots orphanages are 
rare. However, turning to the interface of  local government and rural society/local 
operations, it is, of  course, difficult to care for more than a handful of  children 
without attracting some government attention. Of  the Chinese private orphanages 
interviewed, while Rainbow House has successfully established a partnership with 
the MCA, the remainder are operating quasi-legally as either unregistered or, in 
the case of  Star Village, commercially-registered NGOs. While Shang cites central 
policy as prohibiting private institutional care of  orphans, the evidence from the 
case studies was that all Chinese private orphanages have some dealings with 
local state officials and authorities. It is difficult to make generalisations about the 
nature of  informal interactions between local authorities and unregistered private 
86 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder of  Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
87 See, e.g., Saich, supra note 37; Ashley and He, supra note 37.
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orphanages; the nature of  these interactions varies dramatically from case to case 
and over time, and it would be unhelpful to attempt to mark definitively the line 
between formal and informal recognition by local government (a distinction 
interviewees were generally uninterested in making). Some interactions would 
seem to indicate approbation, at the local level, of  the orphanages’ self-directed 
and self-financed supplementation of  state welfare. In other cases, homes are 
operating for many years in the face of  regular threats from local officials to 
remove the children from their care due to such work being ‘not allowed’, threats 
which have been carried through in other cases.88
Guanghui, Our Lady’s and Good Shepherd all expressly referred to their 
work as being ‘recognised’ (chengren/renke) in some way by local authorities; the 
remaining interviewees were generally equivocal, when asked, as to whether the 
home in question is recognised by local authorities. However, most also related 
stories during the course of  interviews which would seem to indicate that their 
work is observed, and in some cases tacitly encouraged, by local authorities. Many 
placed great importance on examples of  informal support from local officials, for 
example the giving of  gifts at Chinese festivals, and arranging for school admission 
or Bureau of  Household Registration assistance with hukous. Most notable were 
cases where children were being placed into the private home’s care by local police 
or township officials themselves. For example, Our Lady’s was founded in 1993 
by Sister Chen. Until three years ago, there was no state welfare institution in the 
city in which Our Lady’s is located, and it was not uncommon for foundlings to 
be brought to Our Lady’s by police and MCA officials alike. However, the home 
receives no funding from the MCA, and has never been subject to inspections. 
Sister Chen spoke of  their work as being given the ‘green light’ in 1993, in what 
appears to have been an informal understanding with the city’s leadership that they 
would not object to the planned use of  the church land, provided the orphanage 
agreed not to approach the officials for funding. However, she also acknowledged 
that the status of  Our Lady’s is not clear:
88 Interviews: Project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 9, 2010); Father Thomas, Wagner 
Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010); founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
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In principle, I think the government recognises us. If  they did not, they would have the right 
to ban our work. Because they’ve accepted us, it amounts to them agreeing to let us carry 
on.  It’s just that right now they haven’t given us registration.
The home was visited by government officials once, at the time of  its 
founding, and according to Sister Chen has been able to continue operating with 
the ‘trust of  the government and the MCA’ since that time – ‘We’re able to just 
look after the children’. 
I was also made aware of  other orphanage operators who are exceptionally 
good at negotiating local state relations, and have, as a result, been able to enter 
into (unwritten) arrangements whereby their orphanage is recognized as a town’s 
orphan care provider in the absence of  state-run facilities:
That deal was brokered by him agreeing to take on the burden of  running and funding 
the orphanage, in exchange for them [town authorities] making him legal. He got the deal 
because he knows how to play ball. He became friends with the local officials, and they 
knew they could work with him – he would go out and drink and smoke with them. They 
knew he was not a risk to their promotion – if  anything, he was a feather in their cap.89
Star Village, which is currently registered as a commercial enterprise, is another 
example of  the blurry distinction between recognition and non-recognition. The 
organization was for some time registered as a not-for-profit ‘research institute’ 
under the umbrella of  a GONGO, the China Charity Federation (CCF), although 
not registered with the MCA. A change in CCF leadership led to the Star Village 
project being cancelled by the CCF, and Star Village’s leadership decided to 
register instead with the SAIC. However, they have maintained an arrangement 
with the CCF under which they are able to receive domestic donations tax-free. 
I expressed surprise that Star Village is, in this sense, recognised as not-for-profit 
by one branch of  government but denied charitable status by the MCA. The 
managing director agreed the situation is ‘puzzling and complex … but it’s not 
surprising – in China there is a long distance between law and reality’.90
Interviewees from other orphanages reported little to no interaction with 
local authorities. For these homes, their relationships with the local state are most 
89 Interview with founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, (Aug. 9, 2010).
90 Interview with manager, Star Village, in Beijing, (Aug. 20, 2009).
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notable for being absent, and the most important gift from local officials is ‘to be 
left alone’. This apathetic attitude on the part of  local authorities was explained 
by the volunteer coordinator for Home of  Joy:
The local bureau is fully aware of  us – but their first priority is always the economic 
development of  [our city]. If  anything can benefit that, they will do it. The work of  Home 
of  Joy is just not on their priority list, they don’t have the mindset or time to care about such 
a minor problem. They know about Joy’s existence, but they don’t really exist on paper. So 
there are no checking or standards imposed.91
The experience of  Good Shepherd and Chen Anhui was similar: ‘They 
didn’t give us any trouble, although they also didn’t give us any help’;92 ‘We try 
to get forgiveness rather than permission, to do things slowly and quietly rather 
than making a noise. Politics is not our concern – just nice and gently, helping 
the children’.93 Such homes are not beyond the sight of  local authorities, and all 
report having at least one or two unannounced visits by town authorities, usually 
at the beginning of  the home’s history, apparently to ensure that the homes are 
not being used, for example, for child labour or trafficking. For Home of  Joy, 
Good Shepherd and Chen Anhui, such surprise inspections came to an end once 
a degree of  certainty and predictability has been reached after some years of  
uneventful operations.
In other cases, tacit approval is absent, and the relationship is better described 
as one of  hostility and antagonism. Given that the presence of  a foreigner in the 
rural villages where most orphanages are located would be highly unlikely to go 
unnoticed, the orphanages which were willing to host me were naturally those 
with some measure of  perceived security in terms of  their dealings with local 
authorities. However, most interviewees were able to speak at length about the 
hostility experienced by many unregistered orphanages in their dealings with local 
authorities. Home of  Joy experienced a number of  police ‘raids’ when it began 
operating, which continued for many years. These would consist of  unannounced 
inspections of  their grounds, and threats to remove the children from their care; 
91 Interview with volunteer coordinator, Home of  Joy, in Shanghai, (Oct. 13, 2009).
92 Interview with co-managers, Good Shepherd, in Beijing, (Jul. 25, 2010).
93 Interview with volunteer coordinator, Chen Anhui, in Shanghai, (Oct. 4, 2009).
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the orphanage’s volunteer coordinator spoke of  these raids as ceasing when the 
police ‘realised we’re just trying to help the kids’. The relationship has evolved into 
one of  apparent approval, with many of  Home of  Joy’s children being brought 
to their doors by local police themselves. Charles Kramer, who is familiar with 
many of  China’s Catholic orphanages, knows of  two at which the threat to shut 
down operations has in fact been carried out, and believes in both cases this 
related to ‘the religion factor’. In others, local officials simply make life difficult, 
for example an orphanage in a village not far from Guanghui has reportedly been 
‘under surveillance’ for some months now, with authorities preventing visitors, 
including medical volunteers, from entering the home, a restriction which heavily 
impacts on the home’s ability to provide quality care to its resident children.94
Given the prima facie power imbalance in favour of  state officials over 
orphanage operators, it may seem surprising that more orphanages are not being 
shut down. However, a closer look must be taken at this presumed imbalance, 
keeping in mind the vertical space in Chinese government. On-the-ground 
interaction and informal oversight of  the private orphanages is occurring at 
the interface of  local government with society, and most often does not accord 
with central policies: as Sister Qin of  Guanghui observes, ‘Their law says this 
– that orphanages are government’s responsibility; but implementation is at the 
grassroots’.95 The difficulties of  attaining formal provincial or central approval for 
the private provision of  orphan services have been discussed above. However the 
incentives for allowing unregistered homes to continue, with varying degrees of  
recognition by and interaction with local officials, would seem to be most keenly 
felt at the local level. While low-level officials seem reluctant to formalise private 
operations for reasons congruent with those at higher levels of  government 
(namely ambiguous policies, and the financial/political risks of  endorsing non-
state homes), Shang makes the point that in most rural areas it would also be 
“beyond [their] capability…to take over the responsibility of  supporting all the 
children who need protection”96 were the children to be removed from private 
care. This view which was echoed by many interviewees:
94 Interview with visiting physiotherapist, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 10, 2010).
95 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
96 Shang, Wu and Wu, supra note 45, at 132.
37
Groups like us face hardship in doing this work, but we do it very well, and have persisted 
for a very long time…Society cannot do without these social service groups, because the 
government service organisations are unable to undertake the care of  all such children as 
these, they depend on society…Society needs privately-run organisations to stand in for the 
gaps in government services, to assist the vulnerable groups’.97
This lack of  local capacity is also, of  course, what leads to the emergence of  
private orphanages, to fill gaps in government welfare provision.
A related factor at play at the local level is the importance of  guanxi in Chinese 
culture; many of  the homes appear to be very good at building connections with 
officials which potentially go some way in preventing trouble. Many report a steady 
improvement in relations with local authorities over years or decades of  work, 
and the emergence of  a relationship commonly described as ‘one eye open, one 
eye closed’,98 for example: 
The government in its speech and in its tone does not want to be as provocative as previously 
– ‘Your work is illegal!’ – at the very least they recognise that the work we do is charitable 
work, they are not using the same inhuman words of  before. Now they recognise that we 
are doing charitable work, there is at least some verbal acceptance of  it in their language.99
The nature of  an orphanage’s relationship with local authorities is also 
reflected in the willingness of  orphanage operators to approach authorities for 
assistance, and appears largely dependent on the social capital of  its founders 
(that is, in the case of  homes such as Guanghui, Our Lady’s and Good Shepherd, 
the associated church leaders) vis-à-vis the local state, which in turn is affected by 
a number of  factors that vary with time and from place to place. These include, 
most notably, the political liberalism of  the region, attitudes to/tolerance of  
‘grey market’ religious organisations (themselves of  questionable legal status), 
the expression of  political views or advocacy activities of  the orphanage and its 
associates, and association with foreigners. 
97 Interview with manager, Star Village, in Beijing, (Aug. 20, 2009).See, further, interviews 
with Father Thomas (Aug. 11, 2010), Guanghui project manager (Jul. 9, 2010), Sister 
Qin, Guanghui (Jul. 13, 2010).
98 Interviews with project manager, Guanghui; manager/founder, Guanghui, manager, 
Our Lady’s, co-managers, Good Shepherd, and manager, Star Village.
99 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
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A number of  foreigners with long-standing associations with various Catholic 
private orphanages across China believe that the ability to ‘play ball’ with local 
authorities, and garner support and recognition of  the orphanage’s work, is out 
of  reach for the majority of  grassroots operators, due to a lack of  administrative 
capability, it being self-evidently difficult to convince local officials that a decision 
to publicly support and endorse one’s work is politically safe when the organisation 
lacks transparency, internal standards, staff  training programs and adequate 
finances.100 For homes such as Guanghui, where the associated local church has 
had a lengthy antagonistic relationship with local authorities, their political clout 
in terms of  fighting for registration is low.
This lack of  social capital manifests in a sentiment of  disempowerment 
evident in all interviews with homes that have sought recognition and/or 
registration:
Every day we’re chasing the government to their gate, and every day looking for their support, 
and really, we used to go to them all the time. And now we are simply exhausted. We don’t 
want to go again. We don’t have the energy to waste time on this relationship with government. 
And so we are just drifting along. If  we have food to eat tomorrow, then that’s fine.101
The quote shows the ‘us/them’ binary around which the Catholic nuns I met 
seem to have organised their lives, a binary which may be reinforced by the male-
officials/female-caregivers dichotomy. Astute players are able to contrive ways of  
enhancing their bargaining power or social capital with authorities – for example, 
by displaying prominent pictures of  officials who have visited or sponsored their 
children,102 or by having recourse to media and publicity to garner public support 
and avoid being shut down.103
The Catholic interviewees all noted a correlation between the easing of  
religious restrictions over the years, and tolerance and informal support of  
their orphan work. Many stated that they believe religion is the ‘main factor’ in 
100 Charles Kramer (project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei, Jul. 9 2010) and Will Peters 
(founder/CEO of  China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, Aug. 9 2010).
101 Interview with Sister Qin, manager/co-founder, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
102 E.g. Home of  Joy; Star Village.
103 Interview with co-founders, Good Shepherd, in Beijing, (Jul. 25, 2010).
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determining the nature of  their relationship with government. This does not, 
as one might expect, mean adopting an irreligious approach to child care – the 
children at Rainbow House, the registered home, as well as the unregistered 
Guanghui, Our Lady’s, and Good Shepherd, are all brought up in the Catholic 
faith, attending mass and prayers once or twice daily, and, in the case of  older and 
capable children, Sunday school in their villages. Jiemin, a sister at Guanghui, noted 
that the tolerance experienced by Guanghui and its diocese in relation to their 
religious upbringing of  the children, and outreach in the village, is not necessarily 
experienced in other provinces: ‘You can’t do this in other places – but here, the 
government has considerable confidence and does not interfere too much. They 
have one eye open and one closed, knowing we won’t cause much trouble. So we 
don’t have many restrictions imposed on us’.104
Interestingly, almost all Chinese interviewees spoke with a large measure of  
confidence in their continued ability to care for children outside the formal state 
welfare system, despite many having experienced threats and scoldings from local 
officials over the years. However, it would appear that such approbative, informal 
relationships are not necessarily entirely secure, and that despite the trouble and 
financial burden which would be incurred were local officials to decide to shut 
down private homes (some of  which, it must be noted, are caring for many 
hundreds of  children), this is a burden which has on occasion (albeit rarely) been 
willingly incurred – Father Thomas, after relating some examples of  this to me, 
said of  the Catholic orphanages generally, ‘They get a fairly long leash, but will 
be reeled in if  it comes to their attention as less than helpful’.105 Certain patterns 
of  behaviour in the sector are perhaps telling of  a continued awareness of  some 
degree of  vulnerability. For example, most Catholic homes do not welcome foreign 
visitors, and none of  the private orphanages are engaged in advocacy, activities 
which would presumably be sanctioned for the potential attention drawn to the 
gap in Chinese social welfare they fill which officially does not exist. Importantly, 
many Christian interviewees attributed any feelings of  tenuousness regarding 
their home’s security to a history of  antagonism and, at times, persecution of  the 
associated church by officials.
104 Interview with visiting teacher, Guanghui, in Hebei, (Jul. 13, 2010).
105 Father Thomas, Wagner Foundation, in Beijing, (Aug. 11, 2010).
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v. diScuSSion of findingS
This study has presented evidence of  a spectrum of  regulation and oversight, 
from formal to informal, broadly correlating with central momentum toward 
acquisition and registration of  homes, and local impetus for informal oversight 
and recognition. Over time, an equilibrium has been reached involving incongruity 
between central laws and policies, and daily life in the towns and villages in 
which the orphanages, and the local officials who deal with them, are located. 
Local officials continue to take a ‘one eye open, one eye closed’ approach to the 
sector. On the part of  the operators of  orphanages, there seems generally a lack 
of  concern with legality, law and registration procedures, with some exceptions, 
and no expectation that interactions with officials will be guided by law or the 
principle of  equality before the law. All in all, the state-orphanage dynamic across 
the case studies can be characterised as paternalistic and disciplinarian, involving 
‘game-playing’ and cautious pushing of  boundaries over time. The majority of  the 
case orphanages prefer to seek recognition of  the important charitable nature of  
their work when this is seen as a potential means of  garnering legitimacy on which 
to base arguments for occasional or regular practical support, rather than legality 
as a means of  checking local power or on which to base requests for assistance. 
There is little momentum for sector-wide advocacy, and no networks of  mutual 
endeavours for standardisation, expansion or political prioritisation of  orphan 
welfare. The homes are generally inward-focused, with an air of  ambivalence or 
resignation vis-à-vis the current state of  the sector.
There seemed to be no expectation, on either side of  the state-society 
relationship, that the relationship would be shaped, constrained or governed by 
formal legal rules or law (except in cases where informal rules were pushed or 
broken, in which case a show of  state power would be anticipated). In fact, looking 
at the general expectations, understandings and meanings held by actors in the 
field, the sector appears notably ‘non-legal’ in nature, with informal relationships 
trumping formal structures. While there was variance among interviewees as 
to whether law should be available as a standard to be invoked in dealings with 
officials, there was uniformly an expectation that law, rather than constraining 
and standardising both sides of  the state-society equation, would instead only 
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be used as a tool by local officials if  needed to supplement informal processes 
of  negotiation and paternalistic exercise of  discretion. This finding challenges 
law-centric assumptions about the maintenance of  state-society relationships, 
but was not treated as at all unexpected by Chinese interviewees, who commonly 
evinced a perception of  the government as deliberately taking a ‘one eye open, 
one eye closed’ approach to many areas of  regulation. In the resultant, at-times 
ambiguous, regulatory landscape, demarcations between lawful and unlawful, 
tolerance and promotion of  social fields beyond the reach of  the law, become 
somewhat unclear. This seems to have resulted in, at times, very effective local 
government oversight of  a supposedly non-legal sector, which is allowed to exist 
and grow, albeit cautiously and accompanied by a large degree of  self-censorship. 
The extra-legal norms, relationships and processes were generally spoken of  as 
affording players in this field some sense of  security, certainty, and an ability to 
negotiate in a somewhat predictable and ordered manner. On the other hand there 
was a widespread acceptance that doing charitable work in China on the margins 
of  an ambiguous legal landscape, at least for now, necessarily requires tolerance 
of  an on-going sense of  vulnerability to the caprice of  both local and central 
government, and subject to discipline if  boundaries are pushed too far. This state 
of  affairs, with aspects of  security and insecurity, confidence and vulnerability, 
was widely accepted by my informants as an inevitable feature of  doing such 
politically contentious work. 
1. Legitimacy, Legality and the Role of  Law
This is a system in which administrative resources and mechanisms and personal ties play a 
greater role than laws in shaping the negotiating environment. It is a system that on the one 
hand allows a great deal of  flexibility in terms of  how policies and laws are implemented, 
but on the other hand can be arbitrary and capricious. In other words, behaviour in this 
system is guided more by administrative rank and control over resources, and the fear of  
state reprisal, than by [legal] rules.106
Given the dynamic and unclear state of  the legal landscape, it is unsurprising 
that the touchstone for NGO security and capability in the case sector appears 
to be legitimacy and not legality. The longevity and success of  actors in the field 
106 Shawn Shieh, Beyond Corporatism and Civil Society: Three Modes of  State-NGO Interaction 
in China, in state anD soCiety: responses to soCial welFare neeDs in CHina 27 
(Jonathan Schwartz and Shawn Shieh, eds., 2009).
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was dependent not on compliance with legal rules and duties, but rather on 
their ability to negotiate the state in a way which enhanced and maximised the 
political, social and administrative legitimacy107 of  their actions.108 Legal legitimacy, 
in the sense of  recognition and acceptance by formal law-based institutions 
(registration) was, when achieved, generally only attainable after years of  building 
up recognition and acceptance in social, bureaucratic and political spheres. For 
many organisations, legal legitimacy was not considered necessary for operational 
security and capabilities, it being very often possible to attain acceptance by local 
officials and society without needing to be first in compliance with formal law. 
Legality was accordingly often not considered an important goal, and the ‘legal’ 
aspect of  legitimacy was understood and treated in practice as subordinate in 
value to its other aspects. Rather than being dependent on compliance with formal 
law, the state-society relationship at this local level was essentially dependent on 
different competing considerations relevant to political/social/administrative 
acceptability, factors which governed the legitimacy and therefore longevity of  
‘illegal’ activity but which also shifted over time and differed from case to case. 
For example, a general theme in NGO studies, highlighted by the corporatist 
perspective and echoed at the grassroots level of  this study, is that the state-
society relationship is such that officially recognised NGOs tend to be far more 
involved in service provision than advocacy: “We can now hear the voice of  civil 
society…However the voices do not have an institutional position in the process 
of  decision making”.109 Opportunities for such advocacy and participation are 
very much contingent on the sensitivity of  an NGO’s chosen field of  action, or, 
we might say, the social and political legitimacy of  the organization.110
107 Gao, supra note 59.
108 This point relates closely to the many existing studies on the role of  guanxi in Chinese 
business, and the use of  one’s guanxiwang (network of  social connections) to acquire 
social capital and acceptance of  an organization in its environment: see David Ahlstrom 
and Gary Bruton, Learning from Successful Local Private Firms in China: Establishing Legitimacy, 
15(4) tHe aCaDeMy oF ManageMent exeCutiVe 72 (2001); Elliot Carlisle and David 
Flynn, Small Business Survival in China: Guanxi, Legitimacy, and Social Capital, 10(1) j. oF 
DeVelopMental entrepreneursHip 79 (2005).
109 Li, Shang and Cheng, supra note 51, at 66.
110 See further, for example, Guoqin Shen, The Development of  Women’s NGOs in China, in 
ngos in CHina anD europe (Yuwen Li ed., 2011), on the relatively warm reception of  
women’s NGOs in modern China, the goal of  gender equality pursued by such NGOs 
coinciding with government policies on women’s liberation and social development. 
43
A major theme evident in my findings is that of  discipline and paternalism. 
Most notably at the local state/orphanage interface, and regardless of  where 
a particular home was located on the spectrum of  security and apparent 
permissibility, I repeatedly encountered incidents, discourse and interpretations 
which echoed Stephens’ thesis of  disciplinary/parental social control in imperial 
China. Interviewees spoke of  scoldings, threats and berating, and of  feeling at 
the mercy of  local officials regardless of  what (scant) protection they ought to 
ostensibly be afforded by law, policy and procedure. These paternalistic state-
society relationships, and the centrality of  the concept of  legitimacy to the 
state-society interface in China, are relevant to understandings and expectations 
relating to the concept and role of  law in modern Chinese culture. The marked 
concern with legitimacy over legality on the part of  both officials and Chinese 
interviewees, vis-à-vis the nature of  non-state orphan care, demonstrates that the 
legal/illegal binary presupposed by much socio-legal literature is not apposite in 
the Chinese context. The aptness of  the distinction is further called into question 
by the degree to which the lawful/unlawful boundary is blurred in this area of  
regulation. As Gupta argues in a different context, such blurring can be evidence 
of  the “descriptive inadequacy of  categories to the lived realities that they purport 
to represent”.111 Rather than formal laws and policies determining the limits of  
NGO activity, this sphere of  activity is characterised by informal norms, unspoken 
but widely understood by those successfully persevering in the face of  ambiguity 
and uncertainty. Compliance with these rules is an important aspect of  achieving 
and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of  officials, and therefore their tolerance 
or approbation. Moreover, the Chinese homes evinced a preoccupation with 
(non-legal) legitimacy over legality as both functionally and intrinsically valuable.112 
An important conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that the local ‘legal culture’ 
of  China is best described as legitimacy-centric rather than law-centric, which 
manifests as an emphasis on negotiation over regulation – that is, the emergence 
of  normative understandings, in the context of  local state-society interaction, is 
111 Akhil Gupta, Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of  Corruption, the Culture of  Politics, and the 
Imagined State, 22(2) aMeriCan etHnologist 375, 384 (1995).
112 This contrasts with the views of  Western informants, presented elsewhere, which 
generally esteemed legality, in the sense of  an attempt to comply with formal rules and 
policy, as both functionally and intrinsically important.
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predominantly taking place beyond formal law-based institutions, roles and rules, 
being more dependent on aspects of  legitimacy than legality. 
That is not to argue that the extra-legal nature of  this sphere of  activity is 
solely attributable to this type of  legal culture. As Shieh points out, one important 
reason why the legal regulatory mode continues to be usurped by negotiation and 
other modes of  state-society interaction is that “the regulatory mode has been 
inadequate in keeping pace with changes in the NGO community”.113 However, 
it is argued that the peripheral role of  law in this area of  society (among others) 
is, at least to some extent, related to a Chinese tradition in which flexibility, guanxi 
(personal networks), renqing (human empathy and obligations) and individualised 
justice are generally esteemed over abstract, general and certain rules, despite 
central political rhetoric endorsing a move towards the rule of  law. In this way, 
the Chinese legal sensibility just described can be seen as constitutive of  Chinese 
culture, an “extremely characteristic part of  the entire social fabric”,114 and 
itself  in part constituted by culture. This analytical perspective is an important 
corrective to the tendency in commentaries on Chinese law to attribute the notable 
reliance, in many areas of  activity (such as business and NGO work), on guanxi, 
relationships and informal norms solely to a lack of  adequate legal institutions and 
structures,115 without also examining underlying culturally-entrenched values and 
expectations about how society is best ordered.   Among my Chinese informants, 
the dominant expectation regarding law was not that law would be impartially, 
consistently and unambiguously defined and applied, but rather that flexible norms 
would govern individualised, paternalistic relations with the state. This accords 
with Hintzen’s description of  China as a culture in which individualised moral 
decisions are traditionally emphasised above generalised legal rules, and law is 
viewed as subordinate to the “dictates of  morality”, such morality being “rooted 
113 Shieh, supra note 106, at 37.
114 geertz, supra note 19.
115 See, e.g., Katherine Xin and Jone Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal 
Institutional Support, 39(6) tHe aCaDeMy oF ManageMent journal 1641 (1996), arguing 
that in China, ‘managers cultivate personal connections to substitute for reliable 
government and an established rule of  law’ (at 1652); ‘If  laws and reliable government 
cannot provide protection to those wishing to conduct business, businesspeople will 
seek to create their own protection, drawing on the means available to them’ (at 1655); 
Ahlstrom and Bruton, supra note 59.
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in the very essence of  reality and therefore constitut[ing] a more general and 
lasting truth than the more concrete stipulations of  the law”.116 Moreover, this 
was not widely regarded as problematic or, in fact, widely regarded at all, due to 
the emphasis in the field on legitimacy over legality, and discretionary, paternalistic 
relationships over law-governed, standardised interactions. While it may not be 
possible to speculate to what extent these features of  a ‘non-legal’ local society are 
inherent in Chinese culture and a preferred alternative framework for structuring 
social order, and to what extent they are simply a ‘fill-in’ necessitated by a lack 
of  adequate, standard and enforced legal institutions and norms, it is important 
to ensure that inquiries about the maintenance of  an ordered and predictable 
state-society interface in China are approached with a degree of  reflection and 
awareness of  one’s underlying culturally-shaped assumptions about the normative 
nexus between law and order. It is apparent from the case of  this field of  activity 
that Chinese expectations, meanings and experiences relating to law and order, as 
evident at the level of  the local state-society interface, are vastly different to those 
evident in Western law-centric societies. This ‘micro’ picture adds distinction to 
existing ‘macro’ narratives of  central law-lauding rhetoric and China’s on-going 
transition towards rule by/of  law. It demonstrates an on-going embedded cultural 
preference for non-legal order, for li over fa, and continued state-paternalism 
which resonates with Thomas Stephens’ construction of  China as an arena in 
which ‘small-world’ environments can be and often are coordinated and ordered 
by a disciplinary, as opposed to legal, framework.
2. Legal Fictions and Legal Sensibility
On the other hand, formal laws are not completely irrelevant, with the 
shadow of  the threat of  their enforcement being an important element in the 
power-balance of  those relationships and games, by contributing to the perceived 
disciplinary power of  the state.  Further, in this (non-)legal culture, formal laws 
seem to be playing a possible symbolic role, a phenomenon which should be 
investigated further in future studies on China’s law/practice gaps. That is, in the 
current study, formal laws, which ostensibly regulate orphanages in China, as an 
116 Hintzen, supra note 9, at 183.
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official mode of  expression,117 allow the maintenance of  a certain ‘presentation 
of  self ’ – namely, that ‘only government cares for orphans in China’. This 
points to a possible function of  formal laws as a ”repository of  aspirations”,118 
symbolism, ideology and rhetoric, where such rhetoric is of  great social and 
political importance, however ineffectual and irrelevant such laws might appear 
in practice. Another way to describe this hypothesis is that formal laws at times 
constitute a legal fiction with a stabilising function.119 If  that be the case in the 
field of  orphan care, it is possible that attempts to legally codify and tighten the 
permissibility of  non-state orphan care would in fact, by drawing attention to the 
gap between ideology and practice, and due to the importance of  this presentation 
of  self, lead to the closure of  socially-useful informal practices, a disincentive both 
on the part of  officials and social actors to seeking more formalised structure 
of  the field.120 In other words, the gap between law and practice may itself  be 
performing a function – and in this sense be a productive contradiction – by allowing 
controlled, cautious, experimental growth of  the sector. Such a conclusion would 
challenge law-centric assumptions that ambiguous regulatory policies necessarily 
‘chill’ the development of  the sectors they purport to regulate.121
117 In his ethnographic study based on formal and informal interviews with Chinese 
intellectuals, Link notes a common contrast between official and unofficial modes 
of  expression in China (although this is of  course not necessarily a uniquely Chinese 
contrast): perry link, eVening CHats in beijing; probing CHina’s preDiCaMent (W 
W Norton & Company, 1992).
118 Cotterrell, referring to Durkheim’s view of  law as ‘an expression of  ideals. It has moral 
meaning. It is a repository of  aspirations…’: roger Cotterrell, eMile DurkHeiM: law 
in a Moral DoMain (Edinburgh University Press, 1999) at 16. For other examples of  
legal texts, without direct effect but arguably serving symbolic functions, see patriCk 
worMalD, legal Culture in tHe early MeDieVal west: law as text, iMage anD 
experienCe (Hambledon Press, 1999) and paul DresCH, tHe rules oF barat: tribal 
DoCuMents FroM yeMen (Centre Francais D’Archaeologie et des Sciences Sociales, 
2006).
119 barbara yngVesson, belonging in an aDopteD worlD (U. Chicago Press, 2010), at 
80, makes a similar claim in relation to other legal fictions associated with transnational 
adoption, arguing that “[a] key distinction in keeping adoptions clean is the legal fiction 
that money is never paid for the child but only for services performed in connection 
with the adoption…baby-selling…threatens our very understanding of  what it means 
to be (a person) and in this sense destabilizes not only the child who has been sold, but 
society itself ”.
120 joHnson, supra note 51, at 164, makes the point in relation to informal adoption practices.
121 Ashley and He, supra note 37, at 265.
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There was little evidence of  a perceived nexus, on the part of  the Chinese 
informants, between law-abidance and justice or morality. On the contrary, my 
Chinese informants on the whole appeared fairly comfortable within a state-
society relationship premised on discretion, and in which law, when relevant, 
could be anticipated to be used as one tool at the state’s disposal for regulating 
social activity (which points to local expectations of  ‘rule by law’ rather than ‘rule 
of  law’). Most players in the field demonstrated deftness at functioning in the 
absence of  legally-defined relationships, with recurring reference in interviews 
and behaviour to game-playing, trust-building, and keeping up appearances. Thus 
we see that the role of  law in the transitioning society of  China is subordinate to 
other structures and processes, with law as a concept not constructed locally in 
the same way as it is in Western law-centric contexts. This is not to presume that 
thirty years of  law institution building and legal reform has not begun to influence 
this prevailing ‘legal sensibility’, but as Peerenboom notes, ”the development of  
the legal system hinges on more than the ideas of  the top leadership”.122 The 
local state-society interface visible in the current snapshot demonstrates that the 
central law-lauding rhetoric has only begun to penetrate China locally, with themes 
of  discipline and paternalism continuing to dominate trends of  adjudication and 
equality in practice. If, as Peerenboom claims, rule of  law is a function of  both 
institution-building and the creation of  a ‘culture of  legality’,123 studies such as the 
present are important for adding to the picture of  to what extent such a culture 
of  legality can really be said to be present locally.
vi. concLuding ReMaRkS
Apart from its empirical and theoretical contributions to research and 
literature on the aforementioned themes of  modern Chinese socio-legal 
scholarship, this study has sought to introduce some of  the stories of  China’s 
private orphanages. These stories contribute to a bigger picture of  China’s shifting 
social welfare landscape but are important in and of  themselves, providing insight 
into the challenges and struggles experienced by charity workers as they operate 
in an uncertain and at times still hostile social sphere. In the same way, networks 
122 peerenbooM, supra note 9, at 223.
123 Id. at 221.
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of  informal adoptive parents have emerged across China to take in unknown 
numbers of  unregistered foundlings,124 so more and more such children are 
being cared for collectively by private orphanages. In some, the quality of  care is 
high, but in many cases, economic backwardness is evident, children suffer the 
effects of  a lack of  legal personality, and standards of  care are set internally, with 
grave concerns expressed by observers about care practices and the necessities 
of  life. Operators face significant obstacles, such as lack of  financial resources, 
inadequate training, ageing residents, and the dilemma of  planning a future for 
hukou-less children with no prospect of  adoption or state support. Interviewees 
varied greatly in their degree of  optimism regarding the rate of  development 
of  orphan care, and state-society cooperation in this area. The advantage of  
a system that oversees private orphanages beyond the legal framework is that 
it allows good work to be done for orphaned children despite the restrictions 
of  formal law. However, if  government is at all concerned with allowing more 
charitable individuals and groups to carry out life-saving work, the strategy or 
trend is not strong in the long-term. Children continue to languish in substandard 
state orphanages because it is so hard for organised, visible charities to intervene 
and assist in provision of  care in a meaningful, large-scale way without attracting 
suspicion or causing the state to lose face. Some interviewees expressed hope 
that the informal, non-legal operations of  private orphanages has contributed to 
a softening of  the government’s approach to the sector, and indirectly therefore 
to better care for orphans more generally. The sector is cautiously evolving, and 
there is reason to presume it will continue to do so and to be hopeful such growth 
will lead to better outcomes for China’s ‘lonely children’.
124 joHnson, supra note 51, at 161.
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aPPendix a
Table of  Interviews
taBLe a1
list oF interViews witH Case stuDy orpHanages
Interviewee Orphanage Location* Date
Project manager (Kramer) Guanghui Hebei 7/9/10
Visiting physiotherapist Guanghui Hebei 7/10/10
Visiting teacher Guanghui Hebei 7/13/10
Manager/co-founder (Qin) Guanghui Hebei 7/13/10
Manager Our Lady’s Hebei 7/20/10
Co-founder (Chen) Our Lady’s Hebei 21/7/10
Co-managers Good Shepherd Beijing 7/25/10
Volunteer coordinator Home of  Joy Shanghai 10/13/09
Manager/co-founder Rainbow House Hebei 7/12/10
Manager Star Village Beijing 8/20/09
Founder/director (Leng) Star Village Beijing 8/9/10
Volunteer coordinator Chen Anhui Shanghai 10/4/2009
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aPPendix B
Profiles of  Grassroots Organizations and Informants
Participants from a total of  25 different orphan-related grassroots NGOs 
were interviewed as part of  the broader research project. My analysis is primarily 
based on interviews undertaken from July to October 2009 and July to September 
2010 with representatives of  24 orphan-related, (mostly) grassroots NGOs located 
in Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Anhui, Shanxi and Jiangsu provinces and the 
Beijing and Shanghai municipalities. In total, over 75 people assisted in this research 
by sharing their thoughts and experiences in interviews, conversations and NGO 
activities. All interviews were conducted on the condition of  anonymity. Where 
referenced herein, organizations and place names are referred to by pseudonyms. 
These NGOs’ fields of  activity are roughly categorized in table C1.
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On both research trips, approximately half  of  my time was spent living at 
various orphanages and foster homes, helping out with child-care, administrative 
work and English lessons, in order to more closely observe their operations and 
daily living. Fieldwork was conducted with approval from the University of  Oxford 
Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-divisional Research Ethics Committee 
(IDREC).125 I translated Chinese interviews to English freely rather than literally, 
with regard to linguistic nuance and emphasis.
taBLe B1
orpHan-relateD ngos by aCtiVity




Chinese-run foster home 2
Foreign-run foster home 14
Total 25
Interviews were also conducted with a number of  child-related NGOs, 
both foreign and Chinese, with primary content covering NGO laws, policies 
and practice, registration procedures, and issues relating to Chinese civil society 
more generally; a retired senior level Ministry of  Civil Affairs126 official; and the 
following government and government-owned departments and entities: the 
Ministry of  Civil Affairs China Charity and Donation Information Centre;127 the 
Shandong Charity Federation Office,128 and the Ministry of  Civil Affairs NGO 
Service Centre.129
125 Reference number: SSD/CUREC21/C1A 10-010.
126 The Ministry of  Civil Affairs is the administrative authority responsible, inter alia, for 
welfare programmes.
127 Zhonghuarenmingongheguominzhengbu – zhongmincishanjuanzhuxiaoxizhongxin, in Beijing, (Sep., 
2009) [by email].
128 Shandongshengcishanzhonghui, in Jinan, (Sep. 21, 2009).
129  Zhonghuarenmingongheguominzhengbu – minjianzuzhifuwuzhongxin, in Beijing, (Sep. 18, 2009) 
[by telephone].
